SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH
At an Anthrax Lab, the World Changed Quickly New York Times
HOUSTON, Nov. 20 - The rectangular box arrived via overnight delivery at Dr. Theresa Koehler's laboratory. That box contained a smaller box, which held a canister. Inside the canister was another canister, which safeguarded a glass vial. And at the bottom of the vial were anthrax bacteria. The anthrax, sent last week by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, was placed in a refrigerator with six other tubes of virulent anthrax. The refrigerator stands in a small room, which is monitored by a video camera and secured by special locks and an alarm system. There is not even a sign outside the door. The layers of security at Dr. Koehler's laboratory, at the University of Texas Medical School at Houston, are byproducts of the new, suddenly uncomfortable world of anthrax research. The deaths of four people in unsolved anthrax attacks have brought heightened scrutiny to the domestic laboratories where anthrax is stored, particularly now that investigators suspect a home-grown terrorist. For Dr. Koehler, 42, a microbiologist who has studied anthrax for 20 years, the fact that someone made a weapon from the organism to which she has dedicated her professional life is particularly horrifying, even strangely personal. "Even though I had run in circles for years with people who talked about anthrax as a potential bioweapon, I thought, `No way.'" she said. "I just couldn't believe it." Accustomed to the quiet obscurity of her field, Dr. Koehler has found her life upended. Her phone has rung for weeks with calls from reporters and scientists, and from companies asking that she test disinfectants and other products that might have some application to anthrax. Her co-workers have so often stopped her in the hall with questions about the risks of exposure to the anthrax in her laboratory that she has held meetings to offer reassurance. And though university officials refuse to confirm the fact, Dr. Koehler's laboratory is among scores of research facilities nationwide whose records have been subpoenaed as federal investigators compile a list of people who have had access to anthrax. The laboratory is one of a limited number - the disease control centers will not say how many - licensed by the C.D.C. to ship and receive anthrax and other potentially lethal organisms. Dr. Koehler arrived in Houston in 1991, after doing postdoctoral work at Harvard Medical School, and for the last decade she and researchers in her laboratory have studied the genetics of Bacillus anthracis, the anthrax bacterium. Until this year, she had used only strains that, through mutation, she and her researchers had made nonvirulent, posing no health risk. Then, in January, one of her eight researchers wanted to study how white blood cells respond to early infection, an experiment that would require a virulent strain. With little hesitation, everyone agreed. The decision prompted several safety steps: Dr. Koehler's department head provided a small room, situated off a shared equipment room, as a separate laboratory for virulent anthrax. To conduct the experiments, she got supplemental financing from the National Institutes of Health to buy a biosafety cabinet with a protective metal hood. In February, everyone began getting vaccinations against anthrax. Finally, the research team needed to acquire a virulent strain. Rather than getting one from another laboratory, Dr. Koehler decided to make one from her lab's mutated, nonvirulent strains. A virulent bacterium is able to produce anthrax toxin proteins and cover itself with a protective layer called a capsule. The mutated strains that the laboratory had previously worked with did only one or the other. But in September, after a number of failed attempts, Dr. Agathe Bourgogne, a postdoctoral fellow, and Melissa Drysdale, a graduate student, created a virulent strain. "The postdoc who did it said, `Get the champagne!' " Dr. Koehler recalled. "We were very excited. We had a new tool for the lab." But the celebration was short- lived: the abstract world of the laboratory was soon confronted by the reality of Sept. 11. Administrators immediately began instituting tighter security on the medical school and its laboratories. Before, Dr. Koehler had planned to store the virulent anthrax behind a locked door. But the school quickly installed video cameras, the alarm and a card swipe system restricting access. Those steps took on greater significance after Oct. 4, when the first case of inhalation anthrax was reported in Florida. Dr. Koehler says her emotions became ragged, her sleep spotty. Having become known through interviews she gave to news organizations, she removed the nameplate from her office and her laboratory, fearing a break-in. She felt guilt, she says, because for years her work had involved studying genes and proteins rather than research directly applicable to human exposure. "I thought, `God, what have I done for 20 years to put us in a better situation to deal with this?' " she said. "It was like somebody used this organism that we think is fascinating and interesting and fun for such a horrible purpose." The laws regulating anthrax laboratories will undoubtedly soon change. This week Dr. Koehler received e-mail about legislation before Congress that would require criminal background checks of foreign students working in the labs. Her own laboratory includes students and research fellows from Canada, Germany, France, Cyprus and China. Many scientists fear additional restrictions, on legitimate researchers who have always been entirely law- abiding. For Dr. Elke Saile, 39, a postdoctoral research fellow in Dr. Koehler's laboratory who left Germany for the better educational opportunities in the United States, such prospects are chilling. "In academia, we don't spend time on trying to make a more potent killer," Dr. Saile said. "We spend time trying to figure out what the organism does in your body." In that spirit, the researchers are moving ahead with their experiments. The disease control centers recently contacted Dr. Koehler to ask about a presentation in which a research fellow at the laboratory, Yahua Chen, reported at a scientific meeting the discovery of inactive genes in the anthrax bacterium that, if activated, could bring on resistance to penicillin. Penicillin was among the alternative anthrax treatments at which the C.D.C. had already been looking, and so the report raised concern. The centers contacted the laboratory for further study and then forwarded the anthrax sample that arrived last week. The initial experiments are under way. "I feel like now I am contributing something relevant and important," Dr. Koehler said. |
March 23, 2002
U.S. Says It Found Qaeda Lab Being Built to Produce Anthrax By MICHAEL R. GORDON WASHINGTON, March 22 — The United States has discovered a laboratory under construction near Kandahar, Afghanistan, where American officials believe Al Qaeda planned to develop biological agents, officials said today. According to a confidential assessment by the United States Central Command, the laboratory was intended to produce anthrax. The assessment was presented to senior American officials in recent days and is based on documents and equipment found at the site. No biological agents were found in the laboratory, which was still under construction when it was abandoned. American intelligence officials still believe that Al Qaeda would need assistance from foreign experts or foreign governments to mount an effective program to make weapons of mass destruction. "There was a lab under construction in the vicinity of Kandahar," an American official said. "It is another example that they had an appetite for developing biological agents." Throughout the conflict in Afghanistan, American officials have repeatedly asserted that Al Qaeda was trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. For months, American officials have been scouring former terrorist camps and other sites to determine the status of Al Qaeda's efforts. There is ample evidence that the Qaeda organization wanted weapons of mass destruction, including biological agents. Osama bin Laden is said to have considered the acquisition of such weapons a religious obligation. "Documents recovered from Al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan show that bin Laden was pursuing a sophisticated biological weapons research program," said George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence. "We also believe that bin Laden was seeking to acquire or develop a nuclear device. Al Qaeda may be pursuing a radioactive dispersal device, which some call a `dirty bomb.'" But there is still no indication that Al Qaeda ever succeeded in producing biological agents. In general, Al Qaeda's goal of having an arsenal of unconventional weapons seems to have far outstripped its limited technological capabilities. According to American officials, more than 60 sites have been investigated and more than 370 samples have been taken. In only five cases were there any apparent indications of possible biological agents and these were only tiny amounts. Still, American experts are continuing to search Afghanistan for evidence about Al Qaeda's weapons program and to sift through evidence gathered from the sites that have already been discovered. The latest assessment came this week in a report by the Central Command, which is directing the war in Afghanistan. It noted that in addition to documents found at the site, some unused equipment was also uncovered. American officials did not describe the evidence in detail but said that it included medical equipment and supplies that would be useful for legitimate research but could also be used to produce biological agents. Officials also said there was no evidence of pathogens at the Kandahar location. But the evidence, which included documents, indicated that Al Qaeda was interested in producing anthrax. If Al Qaeda had succeeded in producing biological agents in the lab and wanted to put them in missile warheads or bombs, the work would have to have been done at a different site, an American official said. Officials declined to say whether the information was also based on human intelligence: that is, a former Al Qaeda operative, spy or resident who may have been familiar with the program. But this seemed to be a strong possibility. An American official said the discovery of the laboratory generally reinforced the prevailing intelligence estimate about Al Qaeda's limited capabilities. Still, the discovery of the laboratory provides additional information about the extent of Al Qaeda's efforts, including the sort of agents it was interested in producing. Earlier today, there were press reports from London that a biological weapons laboratory had been found in the mountains in the Shah-i-Kot region of Afghanistan near Gardez during the recent United States military operation there. The reports suggested that this was the reason London had decided to dispatch 1,700 combat troops to Afghanistan. American officials said, however, that no biological weapons laboratory had been found in that part of Afghanistan. The Central Command said an abandoned factory for making conventional explosives had been found in the area on March 13. British officials also said that London's decision to send troops was not directly related to Al Qaeda efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. Rather, they said, the British decided to send the troops so that the Central Command would have more forces to conduct mop up operations in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan. The British decision, the largest British deployment since the 1991 gulf war, was announced on Monday. The reference to the laboratory
south of Gardez may be a garbled account of the new assessment by the Central
Command about the laboratory near Kandahar. It is possible that the assessment
was disclosed in London to strengthen the case to the British public for
sending British combat troops to Afghanistan.
Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company |
April 22, 2002
Brooklyn Trial Revisits Fears Over Anthrax After Sept. 11 By WILLIAM GLABERSON In federal court in Brooklyn this morning, a 51-year-old man is scheduled to defend himself against charges that he threw fistfuls of powder into a mailbox outside an elementary school. If he is convicted, he could face life in prison. The difference between what might have been just a weird act and a serious crime, federal prosecutors say, was the date of the incident: Oct. 30, 2001, in the midst of the country's anthrax panic. Tests on the yellowish-brownish powder that was found in the Brooklyn mailbox came back negative for anthrax. But the defendant, Kamal Dawood, a Palestinian construction worker, is charged with threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction: the anthrax that people thought he tossed on the mail. Courts always exist in a sort of time capsule, poring over events after many people have moved on. Mr. Dawood's case is the latest example of how the anxious mood after Sept. 11 is now being relived in courts everywhere, as cases that started in the months after the terror attack are beginning to move through the legal system. "The courts are doing what courts always do, which is recreate an event from the past," said H. Richard Uviller, a Columbia Law School professor. "Even in the ordinary robbery case, the court is trying to recreate the fear and panic the victim felt." But far more than in run-of-the-mill cases, many of the post-Sept. 11 cases are evoking the apprehensions of a jittery time. A federal judge in Brooklyn recently sentenced a 21-year-old Egyptian man to six months for lying to federal officials. On Sept. 19, officers at Kennedy Airport found him entering the country with a fake pilot's uniform in his luggage. He was never charged with any terrorist ties. But prosecutors said he lied about whether he planned to take flying lessons. Last month in Manhattan, two state court judges refused to dismiss charges of inciting to riot and disorderly conduct in separate incidents that might, under other circumstances, have been chalked up as little more than very odd behavior. Both defendants had seemed intent on provoking New Yorkers. One man told a crowd in Times Square a few days after Sept. 11 that "more cops and firemen should have died." The other, carrying a picture of Osama bin Laden, shouted near the World Trade Center ruins in early October that the attacks had been revenge against Americans. Back on Oct. 19, as the country reeled from anthrax hoaxes and other sources of anxiety, President Bush said "anybody in America who would use this opportunity to threaten our citizens" would be vigorously prosecuted. In the case of Mr. Dawood's alleged anthrax hoax, lawyers have been battling over how much of the context of those times after Sept. 11 should be discussed in the courtroom. The assistant United States attorney, Steven H. Breslow, has been arguing to Judge Sterling Johnson Jr. of United States District Court in Brooklyn that only by understanding the context could the jury understand the crime. Two school crossing guards are expected to testify that they saw Mr. Dawood walk up to a mailbox in front of a Bedford-Stuyvesant school. They told police they saw him drink a cup of coffee, put the cup on top of the mailbox and then reach into his pants pocket several times. Each time, they said, he took out a closed fist and deposited something in the box. He then smoked a cigarette, finished his coffee and left. The defense denies that Mr. Dawood placed the powder in the mailbox. There has never been any explanation of what he might have been doing. Mr. Breslow, the prosecutor, has been pressing to recreate the mood of the times. He has asked the judge to allow expert witnesses to describe not only how the powder in the mailbox was handled by officers in protective gear, but also what anthrax is and how it can cause mass deaths. Mr. Breslow has also asked to introduce news reports from this past fall about deaths from anthrax and fears of its transmission by mail. He has even listed an instructor at Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism, Arlene Morgan, to testify about how much news coverage of anthrax there was at the time. The context is needed to explain how people interpreted Mr. Dawood's actions, Mr. Breslow said in a letter to Judge Johnson that was filed in court. "Clearly," the letter said, "the evidence regarding the anthrax bioterrorism of October 2001 is relevant since, before the tumult in the fall of 2001, the defendant's act of placing powder in a mailbox would have been perceived as little more than a tampering" with the mails, a far more minor violation than threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction. According to the letter, the police say Mr. Dawood acknowledged being at the mailbox, drinking coffee and smoking a cigarette, but denied opening the mailbox or putting anything into it. The police also said Mr. Dawood told them he had been in the neighborhood to buy heroin. The defense has asked that his entire statement be kept out of the trial. Mr. Dawood's lawyer, Deborah A. Colson, has also tried to avoid encouraging the jury to recall too much about anxieties last fall. She asked the judge to keep the prosecution from presenting its planned expert testimony about anthrax and the news coverage about the widespread anxiety. According to court filings, Ms. Colson offered to stipulate, or agree, that anthrax is deadly and that it was sent through the mails. Judge Johnson is expected to rule on what evidence will be permitted before the start of jury selection this morning. One issue he will have to decide is whether the prosecutor will be permitted to show the jury a few things that police found in Mr. Dawood's apartment. The defense says Mr. Dawood's job was to install ceramic tile and that the items were completely innocent. Even so, the items could evoke anxious memories. They included grout, three bags of some other powder and a respirator mask. Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company |