| Outside
View: FBI behind the anthrax curve
By Dr. Lawrence Sellin
A UPI Outside View commentary
Published 3/13/2004 2:39 PM
WASHINGTON, March 13 (UPI) --
On Feb. 23, the Washington Times reported the FBI official in charge of
the probe into the 2001 anthrax mailings said the investigation still has
top priority among the bureau's unsolved cases but acknowledged the anthrax
sender may never be caught.
"Despite our very, very, very
best efforts, we still might not be able to bring it home," said Assistant
Director Michael A. Mason, who heads the FBI's Washington field office
investigating the case.
This is in stark contrast to the
Nov. 17, 2001 comments of James Fitzgerald of the FBI Academy's Behavioral
Analysis Unit, reported by CNN: "I'm very positive that before too long
we'll have some real good information, and the investigation will lead
us to the person who is responsible for this."
What went wrong?
Perhaps it had more than a little
to do with the FBI's basic assumption, which stated that they were dealing
with a single suspect who fits a profile similar to serial bombers like
"Unabomber" Theodore Kaczynski.
Fitzgerald said his analysis of
the anthrax-laced letters sent to Sen. Tom Daschle, D-S.D., NBC Nightly
News anchor Tom Brokaw and the New York Post suggested that the anthrax
mailer acted alone and may have used as little as $2,500 worth of lab equipment
to produce the anthrax. The FBI also believes this person is not connected
to those behind the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington.
How one can reach such conclusions
based on the meager and, to some extent, contradictory nature of the content
of the anthrax letters is difficult to guess. Unless, of course, you believe
it must be a Kaczynski-like individual.
From this false assumption all
the "logic" of the subsequent investigation flows.
The FBI produced a profile of
the anthrax mailer who was described as a lone person living within the
United States who had experience working in labs and was smart enough to
produce a highly refined and deadly product.
If employed, he is likely to be
in a position requiring little contact with the public or other employees.
He may work in a laboratory. He is apparently comfortable working
with an extremely hazardous material. He probably has a scientific background
to some extent, or at least a strong interest in science.
He is a non-confrontational person,
at least in his public life. He lacks the personal skills necessary to
confront others. He chooses to confront his problems "long distance" and
not face-to-face. He may hold grudges for a long time, vowing that he will
get even with "them" one day and prefers being by himself more often than
not.
In other words, Ted Kaczynski
with germs.
This conclusion was presumably
strengthened by the identification of the Ames strain of anthrax as the
causative agent. The Ames strain came from an infected animal in Texas,
cultured in Ames, Iowa, and found its way to the U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., in about 1980. Therefore,
the culprit had to be someone in the United States.
All this invariably led to Stephen
Hatfill, who, we soon learned, had worked at Fort Detrick, had a shady
past involving Rhodesia and South Africa, behaved suspiciously and had
a questionable résumé. Lacking sufficient evidence to name
Hatfill as a suspect, the FBI anointed him with the freshly minted label
of "person of interest."
But Hatfill is no Kaczynski.
During the last two years he has
been called a lot of things, but few would describe him as a "non-confrontational
person" and, given his extensive activities in the bioterrorism arena,
not exactly a person who "prefers being by himself more often than not."
So much for the profile. In any case, the FBI has not compiled a case against
Hatfill sufficient to arrest him.
The most concrete result of the
FBI's efforts will likely be a lawsuit against the U.S. government.
The folks at the J. Edgar Hoover
Building in Washington, D.C., might have done well to examine that elephant
standing in the middle of their living room -- al-Qaida. Unfortunately,
accepting this alternative renders the profile and their investment in
it irrelevant.
We are aware of al-Qaida's continuing
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. And the timing of the World
Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and the anthrax letters is entirely consistent
with a "second wave" theory.
But what about those letters from
which Fitzgerald at the FBI deduced so much?
In one of the letters, the word
"We" is used as in "We have this anthrax." The simplest explanation is
a conspiracy, not a lone male. And the writing was certainly not done by
a native English speaker. Sure, it could have been an "opportunist" as
the FBI claims, covering his tracks by blaming it on some foreigners. But
to what end? There has been no follow-up, no further demands. The
opportunist theory also assumes that an individual perpetrator would be
extremely well-prepared for a Sept. 11-like event and would be able to
execute a complex attack in the span of one week.
One popular theory suggests that
it was a frustrated scientist trying to draw attention to the threat of
bioterrorism or even profit from an increase in bioterrorism funding. That
assumes quite a quantum leap in logic: to commit murder to achieve an altruistic
goal or to commit murder and then depend on the vagaries of the grant funding
process.
Yes, it's all a bit of a stretch,
but it fits the profile.
Probably the most significant
error the FBI committed was its cavalier dismissal of the cutaneous anthrax
infection of Ahmed Al Haznawi, one of the hijackers on United Airlines
Flight 93, which crashed in rural Pennsylvania.
On June 25, 2001, Al Haznawi was
treated for a dark lesion on his leg that he said he developed after bumping
into a suitcase two months earlier. Dr. Christos Tsonas, an emergency room
physician at Holy Cross Hospital in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., thought the
injury was curious, but he cleaned it and prescribed an antibiotic for
the infection.
In October 2001, after the first
confirmed anthrax case, Tsonas was shown pictures of black anthrax lesions
by experts at the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies.
It was concluded by these experts that for Al Haznawi's wound, anthrax
was "the most probable and coherent interpretation of the data available."
Nevertheless, Assistant FBI Director
John Collingwood played down the possible anthrax connection. "This was
fully investigated and widely vetted among multiple agencies several months
ago," he said in a written statement in March 2002. "Exhaustive testing
did not support that anthrax was present anywhere the hijackers had been."
It is interesting to note that
no anthrax was present anywhere Ottilie Lundgren of Oxford, Conn., and
61-year-old Kathy Nguyen of New York had been, both of whom died of inhalation
anthrax.
Another clue related to the timeline
of the anthrax attacks occurred in late August 2001. Gregg Chatterton,
a pharmacist in Delray Beach, Fla., said he had told the FBI that two of
the hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi, came into the pharmacy
looking for something to treat irritations on Atta's hands. According to
Chatterton, both of Atta's hands were red from the wrists down including
the palms. They weren't blistering -- they were simply red as if you had
taken your hands and dunked them in a bucket of bleach or something. Marwan
Al-Shehhi also needed something for "a cough."
This occurred immediately prior
to the dates when all the hijackers bought their flight tickets, Aug. 24-31.
The date of the attack was set for "9-11-01" as written in the anthrax
letters. Was this the time the letters were prepared, and were Atta and
his co-conspirators involved in their preparation and hand-off to the mailers?
Many people have been perplexed
by the FBI's apparent focus on domestic terrorism, because the bulk of
the evidence seems to point to a foreign connection. It is unlikely, however,
that al-Qaida had the capability to produce such a high quality product.
The FBI itself was unable to reproduce a similar product through back-engineering.
Therefore, it had to come from another source.
The Ames anthrax used in the attack
could have been pilfered from Fort Detrick, the British Biodefense Establishment
at Porton Down or any one of about 20 other labs in possession of that
particular strain. It is believed that the Soviet Union had the Ames strain,
and Iraq and Russia continued to have high-level military meetings involving
biological warfare at least into the mid-1990s.
Other countries with presumably
active biological warfare programs such as North Korea or Iran are potential
sources, among others. Given the relatively small amounts involved, sale
through black market intermediaries remains a possibility.
Detailed analysis of the anthrax
in the letters indicated that it was about two years old at the time of
the attack. Did Iraq have such a capability within two years of the attack,
or was it processed elsewhere? It makes sense that Saddam Hussein, wanting
both revenge and to operate clandestinely, would choose a strain of U.S.
military origin. A finished product could have been transferred to Iraq
and passed to Mohammed Atta in April 2001 via an Iraqi Intelligence operation
in Prague. Other routes into the United States could have been easily used
at later dates. Was there more than one batch delivered?
For many, there is still no convincing
published evidence supporting the hypothesis that a lone domestic terrorist
was the perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax attacks, while there is substantially
more evidence pointing to a non-domestic source. The precise timing of
the anthrax letters, first mailed within a week of 9/11, and the success
of the perpetrators in eluding capture both suggest
a sophisticated level of planning
not usually associated with an opportunistic attack.
--
(Dr. Lawrence Sellin
has conducted research involving the development of medical defenses against
chemical and biological weapons. He has also served in military assignments
dealing with weapons of mass destruction.)
--
(United Press International's
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