NOTES FROM THE EDITOR'S CUFF
By Reed Irvine

ON OCTOBER 28, THE WASHINGTON POST RAN A BIG FRONT-PAGE STORY ON HOW “A significant number of scientists and biological warfare experts are expressing skepticism about the FBI’s view that a single disgruntled American scientist prepared the spores and mailed the letters.” It quotes Dr. Richard Spertzel, the chief biological inspector for the U.N. Special Commission from 1994 to 1998, as saying, “In my opinion, there are maybe four or five people in the whole country who might be able to make this stuff, and I’m one of them.” He added, “And even with a good lab and staff to help run it, it might take me a year to come up with a product as good.” If he is right, that rules out Dr. Steven Hatfill, who has never worked with anthrax. 

THE POST SAID ANTHRAX SPORES MAILED TO SENATOR DASCHLE HAD BEEN PROCESSED to a grade of one trillion spores per gram, 50 times as fine as anything produced by the U.S. offensive bioweapons program. But Dr. William C. Patrick III, who was head of that program when it ended in 1969, told the New York Times last December that they had processed anthrax spores to a grade of one trillion per gram, the same size as the spores in the Daschle letter. Some scientists interviewed by the Post said spores that small would have to be coated with fumed (colloidal) silica to keep them from clumping and impeding their dispersal. The Post said the U.N. had reported in the 1990s that Iraq had 10 tons of this silica with the brand name “Cab-O-Sil” that was “probably destined for its chemical weapons program.” The U.N. inspectors had also found that Iraq had three spray dryers that could have been used to coat the anthrax with the silica. Two of them had been destroyed and the third had been scoured and sterilized before inspectors could examine it. The implication was that Iraq was a more likely source of the Daschle anthrax than Steven Hatfill, the FBI’s only known “person of interest.” 

THIS WASHINGTON POST STORY BY GUY GUGLIOTTA AND GARY MATSUMOTO WAS followed by a November 5 letter from Dr. Matthew Meselson of Harvard and Ken Alibek of the Center for Biodefense at George Mason University. They suggested that the scientists quoted in the Post story may have been wrong in saying the anthrax spores were coated with silica. Meselson and Alibek said they had examined micrographs of the Daschle anthrax spores and could not see certain distinctive features that other scientists said were associated with the silica coating according to the Post story. They concluded their letter saying, “Until knowledgeable governent investigators announce their results, statements attributed to anonymous sources or from persons who have not examined the actual evidence should be treated with caution.” [Dr. Meselson did not follow that advice when, without interviewing any of the Special Forces troops involved in Operation Tailwind in Laos in 1970, he told CNN’s Peter Arnett that “the gas described by the commandos fits the description of sarin nerve gas.” That bolstered the claim CNN made in 1998 that the Special Forces used deadly sarin gas against Vietnamese troops and that the commandos themselves were exposed to it, a claim CNN had to retract.] 

KEN ALIBEK RAN THE SOVIET BIOWEAPONS PROGRAM BEFORE DEFECTING AND ADDING to our knowledge with his book Biohazard. He has cast doubt on the FBI theory that Dr. Hatfill may have been behind the anthrax attacks, telling Newsmax.com that he believes “the source of the anthrax attack was foreign, not domestic, as claimed by the FBI.” He cited the fact that the hijackers were looking for crop dusters, an indication they wanted to disperse a chemical or biological agent. The first cases of anthrax were in Florida where some of the hijackers lived. One of them developed an ugly, unexplained ulcer. Alibek is critical of the FBI’s failure to conduct an immediate search of their dwellings. He said that no opportunity to investigate any possible lead should be lost and that it is a mistake to pursue a single lead for many months, only to find that it is a dead end. By then, he said, “ It’s too late to go back to seek for some other cause... because in many cases, people have short memories.” The public is confronted with three possibilities: the anthrax was produced by a foreign government program costing millions of dollars; it was produced by a lone scientist in his home at a cost as low as $2,500; or a lone scientist stole it from a government laboratory. The Baltimore Sun’s Scott Shane has been pushing the lone scientist theory, focusing on Hatfill. The Post’s Guy Gugliotta makes a case for blaming Iraq while leaving the door open to theft from a federal lab. The FBI is doing what Ken Alibek says they should avoid. 

"PERSON OF INTEREST" TAKES IT PERSONALLY

Dr. Steven Hatfill, the so-called “person of interest” in the anthrax letters case, announced at an October 5 Accuracy in Media conference that lawsuits are planned against those who have accused him of involvement in the murders of five people.  For the first time publicly, Hatfill directly confronted and dismissed many of the accusations that have tried to link him to the deadly letters. His comments were covered by CNN and Fox News. 

Hatfill, who has the expertise to help prepare America for biowarfare waged by countries such as Iraq or international terrorists, understands how to save lives. But he has been run out of two jobs because of the government and media campaign against him. Hatfill said, “A year ago at this time I was involved in theoretical studies helping to determine means by which we could protect our ports and harbors from large-scale biological events. Several months ago I was involved in designing and implementing 46,000 first responders in how to handle biological incidents. Now I sit at home and watch CNN.” 

“What upsets me the worst,” he said, his voice cracking with emotion, is that “my country is getting ready for war, and I’m left on the sidelines.” 

False Reports Finger Hatfill

Hatfill, whose career and reputation have been ruined by media coverage of the case, told the conference that he once believed the media were fair and accurate. “Like many Americans I trusted that the news that would be presented to me on television and in the newspapers would be filtered and have some degree of accuracy,” he said. “I took this for granted.” He now knows better, he said, because the media have falsely depicted him as the anthrax killer of five people. 

He attacked a Brian Ross story on ABC News that said he lived near a Greendale school in Zimbabwe in Africa. This was said to be incriminating because a Greendale school was listed on the return address on some of the letters. “There is no Greendale school in Zimbabwe and never has been,” Hatfill said. 

Hatfill said he was partly responsible for a report on how government “first responders” to a biological or chemical attack could deal with the anthrax letter hoaxes that were occurring in the U.S. This was designed to help America prepare for the real thing. And yet it was “turned against me [and the media] said that it was a blueprint for the anthrax letters attack,” he noted. He called the coverage of this matter “complete rubbish.” 

It was also reported that Hatfill had written an unpublished novel on anthrax letters being sent to Congress—another blueprint of what actually happened. He said that in fact, it dealt with mad cow disease and other emerging infections and the FBI was the hero of the book. He said. “Well, I’m busy rewriting the book.” 

“A lot of what I can see in the FBI’s investigation of me has been driven by the press,” he said. “An article appears in some newspaper that I have a secret mountain cabin. What’s the next question I’m asked by the FBI? ‘Do you have a secret mountain cabin?’” That cabin turned out to be a home belonging to a Washington attorney where Hatfill and friends gathered for dinner and conversation. 

While Hatfill’s life has been made miserable for many months, the FBI has failed to identify the real perpetrators of the anthrax attacks. 

Asked for his suspicions about where the anthrax came from, Hatfill replied: “Throughout this entire year I’ve tried to sit on the fence. There are times when I think it could be domestic. There are times when I think it’s foreign. I don’t know. I don’t have enough information. I haven’t seen the powder. I don’t have enough scientific evidence to make any sort of determination except that when these deaths happened I think we all thought it was terrorism. It was a follow-on to 9/11, and I for one was shocked when the FBI declared that this was a domestic incident. I thought they were out of their minds. It’s hard to make any decision unless you have the evidence. I haven’t seen the powder. I can’t comment on it — its sophistication or anything else. I don’t have enough data to make a firm conviction. However, I believe if it had been domestic after the millions of dollars and thousands of man- hours that the FBI has put into this, I think those people would be in jail now. And I think the fact that there is no suspect points us towards perhaps a foreign power or a terrorist group involved — just simply by the process of elimination.”

Described by Attorney General John Ashcroft himself as a “person of interest” in the case, Hatfill has been forced to hire a lawyer and hold two news conferences to deny that he is responsible for the anthrax letters. His lawyer, Victor Glasberg, has filed a complaint with the Justice Department over how his client has been treated. Hatfill has been tailed by the FBI and his apartment has been searched three times. Yet he is not a suspect, no evidence has been found, and Ashcroft admits the FBI isn’t close to an arrest. In one of the most blatant media distortions in the case, Newsweek claimed that FBI bloodhounds went crazy around Hatfill, thereby linking him to the anthrax letters. But the scientist dismissed that, saying he had merely petted one of the dogs walking around him in a room. “Dogs like me,” he joked. 

Hatfill revealed that the country’s top active expert in dried biological warfare agents — Bill Patrick — who had been polygraphed by the FBI and brought into their inner circle — was now being targeted as well, and that bloodhounds were “out sniffing him the other day.” “I didn’t know it could be like this in the United States,” he said. “We’ve gone nuts. We eat our own here.” 

Ashcroft Leads The Campaign

Hatfill was the surprise guest on a panel discussion of the anthrax case that also included his spokesman, Pat Clawson; investigative free-lance journalist Nicholas Stix; and Kenneth J. Dillon of Spectrum Bioscience, Inc. The panel was moderated by Cliff Kincaid, the author of an AIM Report characterizing Hatfill as another Richard Jewell, the security guard falsely accused of the Olympic Park bombing. 

Clawson, a former investigative reporter for CNN and other media, told the conference that coverage of Hatill has been “gossip masquerading as fact,” generated by leaks from the Department of Justice and the FBI, and he accused the media of malpractice. He said investigative journalism has been discarded in favor of “news candy” that seeks to entertainand not inform. Clawson said that he was interviewed by Geraldo Rivera of the Fox News Channel about the case and that Rivera was so unprepared to discuss the facts and looked so foolish that the story based on the interview never aired on the network. Instead, Rivera told viewers that Clawson had offered “nothing new” in the case and so the interview was killed. 

Clawson blasted Attorney General Ashcroft for accusing Hatfill of being a “person of interest” in the case without having any evidence against him. He said Ashcroft lied on CNN’s Larry King Live when he said that the firing of Hatfill from a job in biodefense at Louisiana State University was a decision made by the university alone. In fact, the Justice Department had told the university not to use Hatfill in the program, which it funded. 

Kincaid opened the discussion by noting evidence of al Qaeda interest in biowarfare from the FBI interrogation of American Taliban John Walker Lindh. Terrorist trainers told Lindh that the next wave of terrorism after 9/11 was to be chemical or biological attacks. Medical reports suggest that two of the 9/11 hijackers may have come into contact with anthrax. Two other possible hijackers, Ayub Ali-Khan and Mohammed Jaweed Azmath, now in U.S. custody, after 9/11 quickly left New Jersey, where the anthrax letters were postmarked. Sources told CNN and the Associated Press that the men had large amounts of cash, hair dye and box cutters in their possession. New Jersey was a base for the bombers of the World Trade Center in 1993. A microbiologist with dual Iraqi-American citizenship living in New Jersey was involved in that bombing. Another key player, an Iraqi named Abdul Rahman Yasin who had a New Jersey apartment, was questioned by the FBI, released, and then fled to Baghdad. He was interviewed by Lesley Stahl of CBS 60 Minutes earlier this year, advertised as “The Man Who Got Away.” 

Al Qaeda was interested in anthrax as a weapon, had labs designed to make it, and reportedly had purchased it. CNN has al Qaeda videotapes showing their access to chemical and biological agents. CNN also reported an al Qaeda terrorism manual includes instructions on how to send a “poisonous letter.” 

National Security adviser Condoleeza Rice said on September 26 that the Iraqi regime was sheltering members of the al Qaeda terrorist network in Baghdad and helping bin Laden’s operatives in developing chemical weapons. Doesn’t it make some sense, Kincaid asked, to consider that Iraq and al Qaeda were behind the anthrax letter attacks? Despite the statements of Rice and Rumsfeld on an al Qaeda link to Iraq, the administration has seemed reluctant to make a full-blown case. From the FBI’s point of view, this might expose other FBI failures. Kincaid speculated that it might lead to disclosures relating to the FBI’s failure to hold Iraq or al Qaeda responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the Oklahoma City bombing. 

Anthrax Letters Analysis

Kenneth J. Dillon, a former Foreign Service officer and intelligence analyst, described the writing on the envelopes carrying the anthrax letters as authentic expressions of an al Qaeda operative. In what appeared to be the work of someone who spoke and wrote poor English, they said, “Take Penacilin (sic) Now. Death to America. Death to Israel. Allah is great.” Dillon said, “None of the various features of the letters points clearly to a domestic terrorist.” In particular, he said telling the target person to get “penacilin” can be explained as gloating, as making sure that the person would not just die of an unknown cause, or as an attempt to mislead. 

On why Democratic Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy were targeted, Dillon noted that this has been viewed by some as an indication that the letters were the act of a domestic right-winger. But in fact, he said, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the key component of al Qaeda under Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, head of al Qaeda’s biowarfare program, had targeted Senator Leahy because of his role as head of a panel of the Senate Appropriations Committee that had developed the so-called “Leahy Law” in 1998. Dillon explained, “According to the wording of the Leahy Law, the U.S. Government was authorized to ‘render’ suspected foreign nationals to the government of a foreign country, even when there was a possibility that they would be tortured, in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ When the Leahy Law was applied to send EIJ members captured in the Balkans back to Egypt, Zawahiri fiercely denounced the United States. So Leahy was a high-priority target.” 

Dillon added, “Neither fingerprints nor DNA evidence was found on any of the letters, suggesting that the mailer had excellent forensic skills. It is conceivable that a domestic terrorist had mastered forensics, but it is not likely. Forensic skills are highly characteristic of a former Egyptian intelligence agent or special forces operative.” 

Where did al Qaeda obtain its anthrax? Dillon said the high level of 1 trillion spores per gram in the letters to the senators must be the result of a team effort, not the work of a single disgruntled scientist. “This is a high-technology product that required iterative testing by a team of microbiologists, physical chemists, and chemical engineers over the course of several years and at a cost of millions of dollars,” he said. He suggested the source may have been the Porton Down Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment via the civilian Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research located in the same town. Dillon speculated that some scientist involved with one of these two institutes or with Porton Products and BioPort, Inc., companies owned by the Lebanese Fuad el-Hibri and working on behalf of the Saudi government, could have stolen a few grams each of various batches of anthrax and then sold them to al Qaeda. A subsequent report in the Washington Post quoted several scientists and biological warfare experts as saying that the evidence points to a foreign government such as Iraq as the likely source. Iraq may have given the anthrax to al Qaeda. 

Dillon suggested investigating possible al Qaeda involvement in other incidents, such as the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 from JFK Airport on November 12, 2001—just a month after the 9/11 attacks. “The most plausible explanation of that crash is that, as the aircraft dipped in the downdraft of a preceding JAL jet, a Stinger missile missed the rear exhaust and sheered off the vertical tail stabilizer instead. The most likely suspect must be considered the same individual who sent the anthrax letters. He is probably a former Egyptian special forces operative trusted by Zawahiri. His range was from Trenton to JFK Airport, placing him most likely in northeastern New Jersey.” While the Flight 587 hearings are pointing to co-pilot error with the rudder as the most likely cause of the crash, Dillon says the Stinger missile hypothesis has not been adequately investigated. 

Hatfill’s Main Accuser

Nicholas Stix, a free-lance investigative journalist who serves as Associate Editor of Toogoodreports.com, discussed his research into the background and motivations of Dr. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, one of Hatfill’s main accusers. Stix, one of the first journalists to expose the “high-tech lynching” of Hatfill, said Rosenberg is a professor of environmental science at a performing-arts college in Purchase, New York, who has nevertheless emerged as a major critic of America’s biodefense community. A prominent figure in media coverage of the Hatfill case who has been consulted by the FBI, she has peddled the theory that the U.S. biodefense program, not a foreign terrorist group or government, was the source of the anthrax used in the attacks. 

Rosenberg believes that a member of this program sent the anthrax letters to warn the public of biological weapons and generate more funds for biodefense. After she met with the FBI and staffers to Senators Daschle and Leahy on June 18, an FBI search of Hatfill’s apartment was launched on June 25 with journalists on the scene and even circling in helicopters overhead. Stix noted that when this failed to turn up anything, the FBI used the dubious story of bloodhounds going “crazy” around Hatfill to justify another search on August 1. This story was given to Newsweek. 

Stix called Rosenberg the “Dr. Strangelove of the American left” and noted that she is
committed to passage of a protocol to a U.N. treaty to prohibit biological weapons. Under the protocol, a body of “experts” would inspect and monitor a country’s ability to make biological agents. But foreign spies on such a body could discover U.S. developments in biodefense and help America’s enemies counter or overcome them, making the U.S. more vulnerable to such attacks. This is one factor behind the Bush administration’s rejection of the protocol. But if it is proven that a current or former member of the U.S. biodefense community is behind the anthrax attacks, that would seem to make it imperative in Rosenberg’s mind that American work with such biological agents be strictly monitored under the protocol. 

Anthrax attacks set off a frenzy of invention
Mail screeners, sterilizers, test kits among devices

Knight Ridder/tribune

PHILADELPHIA - Fueled by unrelenting coverage of last year's anthrax attacks, David O'Neal of Marlton, N.J., wanted to become part of the solution.

One late night last fall, it came to him: the ClearView Mailbox.  Resembling an incubator the shape of a log cabin, the transparent container allows users to sort through the enclosed mail using attached rubber gloves. 

"We are just about ready to go into mass production," O'Neal said. 

The investigations into the anthrax attacks that killed five people last fall have yet to yield an arrest. Much more fruitful has been the invention blitz set off by a heightened sense of the nation's vulnerability to biological terrorism. 

"We are talking about the equivalent of a space program," said John W. Caldwell, an attorney for Woodcock Washburn, an intellectual-property law firm in Philadelphia. "It's a big, big thing.  Fortunately, we are not fighting gravity." 

Synthetic blood. Cutting-edge pharmaceuticals. Million-dollar mail sorters. Do-it-yourself test kits.

From the inventor next door and from Fortune 500 companies, scores of products inspired by the four anthrax-laced letters sent from Trenton, N.J., last year are available or in development. 

Take Prime Alert, also called the Hoax Buster. 

The Spokane, Wash., company that developed the device specialized in testing dairy products and fermented alcohol for bacteria until its officials got the call to duty.

"Here we are drinking beer and eating cheese," GenPrime product manager Darby McLean said, when they were approached by their U.S. representative, George R. Nethercutt, a Republican on the House Science Committee.

He asked GenPrime to use its food-inspection technology to create a quick test for bioterrorism agents. A few months later, the Hoax Buster was born. 

Combine the suspect substance with a test formula provided in 10 vials and pour the solution into a handheld detector. Thirty seconds later, the customer knows whether he has mere baking powder or a big problem. Price: $7,500. 

Because using the Prime Alert requires handling potentially dangerous material, the product is marketed to hazardous-materials teams and fire departments.

For the corporate client, there is the Mail Defender, a desktop device that can sterilize mail without making it crisp or brittle, a common complaint among federal government workers handling irradiated mail. 

By applying moisture, the Defender can expand the molecular structure of anthrax and other deadly bacteria. Then, in a process that resembles the cycle of a clothes dryer, contaminants are heated and destroyed. Price: $10,000. 

"This system that we are selling will be able to clean anywhere between 10 and 20 pounds of mail at a time," said Michael Guevremont, vice president of Virginia-based Executive Protection Systems.

For significantly more cash, defense giants Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin offer competing large-scale mail processors for government use.

Lockheed's BioMailSolutions was introduced in January. It combines high-tech sorting capabilities with detection technologies similar to what weapons inspectors are using in Iraq. Price: up to $1 million, with optional equipment that ranges from $20,000 to $200,000. 

"Some of this technology was developed for a battlefield environment," said Cynthia Sailar, vice president for Lockheed's Distribution Technologies.

Keeping mail safe is only part of the response to the anthrax attacks. Since then, the number of care options for biological terrorism victims has exploded.

GlaxoSmithKline, which has its U.S. headquarters in Philadelphia, is working with the federal Food and Drug Administration for approval of two antibiotics - Amoxil and Augmentin - to treat anthrax. The company is also said to be in acquisition talks with Bayer AG, makers of Cipro, the anthrax-killing antibiotic. 

Also up for FDA approval is a "blood substitute" produced by Biopure in Cambridge, Mass. The firm's chief executive officer told Congress this year that the saline and cow blood compound could be used in case a wide-scale bioterror attack reduced the number of potential blood donors.

Cow dies from anthrax at farm

A cow has died of anthrax on a Scottish farm, it has been confirmed. 

Health officials in East Dunbartonshire said the disease was found in an animal which died several days ago. 

It is thought to be the first case of the disease in Scotland for five years. 

The area around Balcorrach farm in Lennoxtown was cordoned off to be disinfected - but council officials stressed that the incident posed no risk to the general public. 

It was confirmed on Sunday that the animal had died of anthrax several days earlier. 

Police sealed off the farm to allow health officials at East Dunbartonshire Council to burn all the areas where the animal had been kept. 

Council spokesman David Maclavin said the bacteria could be present in the ground where cattle and sheep were kept, and could come to the surface after heavy rain. 

Direct contact

But he stressed: "There is absolutely no risk to public health. 

"This is a naturally occurring bacteria and these outbreaks do occur occasionally. 

"You would have to be in direct contact with an infected animal to run a risk of catching anthrax. 

"We are not talking about a highly-refined laboratory strain of the disease." 

The last case of anthrax in Scotland is thought to have been in 1997. 

On average, five or six cases of the disease are found in cattle in the UK every year. 

By Gerry J. Gilmore
American Forces Press Service
source: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2002/n12092002_200212096.html

WASHINGTON, Dec. 9, 2002 – Whoever unleashed the anthrax assaults that killed five people last year is most likely a trained biomedical technician. 

That's the belief of the new chief of the U.S. agency responsible for national medical preparedness for biological, chemical and nuclear terrorist attacks. 

Dr. Julie L. Gerberding, recently appointed as the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, told a homeland security conference audience here today that everything changed regarding homeland security after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist-hijacked airliner attacks on New York City, the Pentagon and Pennsylvania. 

She also pointed out the still unsolved anthrax attacks that began Sept. 18 last year highlighted the nation's vulnerability to yet another potential terrorist weapon: bio-terrorism. 

Last year, as acting director of the CDC's National Center for Infectious Diseases, Gerberding played a key role in orchestrating her agency's response to the Sept. 18-Dec. 8 postal-system-launched anthrax attacks in New Jersey, New York City, Florida, Maryland, Connecticut and the District of Columbia that infected 22 people and killed five. 

That the FBI hasn't yet caught the perpetrator of the anthrax attacks isn't surprising, she noted. 

"I think it is a huge challenge -- in part, because it's (like) looking for a needle in a haystack," the infectious disease clinician explained. 

Whoever launched the anthrax attacks possesses "incredible, sophisticated knowledge about what they are dealing with," she continued. "They had to protect not only themselves, but the people in their environs from exposure to the powders, which basically function as a gas." 

Gerberding added that the method in which the anthrax attacks were carried out indicates intricate planning and a level of sophistication that suggests the culprit's "not somebody who went in their garage and cooked this up over the weekend." 

Since last year's hijacker and anthrax terror attacks, she noted, more than $900 million has been disbursed through CDC and other U.S. agencies to state and local organizations for homeland security-related missions. 

The recent creation of the Department of Homeland Security, she pointed out, should also enhance coordination, communication and planning of national anti- terrorism efforts. In fact, she said, CDC and other agencies are now working to develop a national distribution system for the smallpox vaccine. 

However, more remains to be done, especially when the perpetrator or perpetrators of the anthrax attacks are at large, she emphasized. 

"We haven't caught these people and that tells me that the alertness and the level of vigilance that has to go on in emergency departments throughout the country has not changed," Gerberding said. 

She noted that 12 letters "almost shut down the U.S. Postal system" during the anthrax threat. 

"It wouldn't take many more (such) letters to really create an enormous catastrophe. … Our best defense is to find the (perpetrator of the) first (anthrax) case," she concluded. 

source:  http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v288n22/rfull/joc21393.html   (requires a subscription)
 

Secondary Aerosolization of Viable Bacillus anthracis Spores in a Contaminated US Senate Office

Christopher P. Weis, PhD; Anthony J. Intrepido, MS, CIH; Aubrey K. Miller, MD, MPH; Patricia G. Cowin, MS,
CIH; Mark A. Durno, BS; Joan S. Gebhardt, PhD; Robert Bull, PhD 
 

Context  Bioterrorist attacks involving letters and mail-handling systems in Washington, DC, resulted in Bacillus anthracis
(anthrax) spore contamination in the Hart Senate Office Building and other facilities in the US Capitol's vicinity. 

Objective  To provide information about the nature and extent of indoor secondary aerosolization of B anthracis spores. 

Design  Stationary and personal air samples, surface dust, and swab samples were collected under semiquiescent (minimal
activities) and then simulated active office conditions to estimate secondary aerosolization of B anthracis spores. Nominal size
characteristics, airborne concentrations, and surface contamination of B anthracis particles (colony-forming units) were
evaluated. 

Results  Viable B anthracis spores reaerosolized under semiquiescent conditions, with a marked increase in reaerosolization
during simulated active office conditions. Increases were observed for B anthracis collected on open sheep blood agar plates
(P<.001) and personal air monitors (P = .01) during active office conditions. More than 80% of the B anthracis particles
collected on stationary monitors were within an alveolar respirable size range of 0.95 to 3.5 µm. 

Conclusions  Bacillus anthracis spores used in a recent terrorist incident reaerosolized under common office activities. These
findings have important implications for appropriate respiratory protection, remediation, and reoccupancy of contaminated
office environments. 

JAMA. 2002;288:2853-2858 
 

On October 15, 2001, a letter containing threatening language and a light tan powdery substance was opened in the mail
handling area of a Senate office suite in the Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. Federal officials removed the letter
and shut down the local air handling systems. The letter was transported to the US Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Disease and was subsequently confirmed to contain viable Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) spores that were dispersible
in air.1 Scanning electron microscopy of the spores used in the Senate office attack showed that they ranged from individual
particles to aggregates of 100 µm or more. Spores were uniform in size and appearance and the aggregates had a propensity
to pulverize1 (ie, disperse into smaller particles when disturbed). 

Following the attack, nasal swabs were collected by other investigators from more than 7000 building occupants and cultured
for B anthracis. Twenty of 38 individuals in the office suite where the envelope was opened had positive nasal swab tests
including 13 individuals present in the vicinity of the mail area and 7 workers on an interconnected lower floor. Additionally, 2
workers from an adjacent office suite that entered an adjoining contaminated hallway and 6 emergency responders who
entered the office or hallway had positive nasal swab tests. 

The building was officially closed to the public on October 17, 2001, with access to the contaminated suite limited to forensic
investigators only. This study was completed after forensic investigation and prior to remediation of the Hart Senate Office
Building. 

Information regarding primary aerosolization of B anthracis spores has been reported,2-5 but few data are available regarding
secondary aerosolization indoors. The purpose of this investigation was to evaluate secondary aerosolization of viable B
anthracis spores under both quiescent and active office conditions. Understanding secondary aerosolization (reaerosolization)
of B anthracis spores in building environments is essential for exposure assessment and risk evaluation following bioterrorism
attacks. Such understanding will also guide cleanup strategies for readily dispersible bioaerosols. 
 

METHODS 
 

Environmental samples were collected in the affected Senate office suite (total area approximately 1200 sq ft) beginning 25
days after the initial incident. Stationary and personal air samples and surface samples were collected during 3 separate building
entries (Table 1). Initial semiquiescent sampling was followed by second and third rounds of sampling under simulated active
office conditions. All analyses were conducted such that only viable spores or spore aggregates were recorded. 

During semiquiescent sampling, movement was minimized in the suite while air and surface samples were collected from various
locations. During the semiquiescent sampling, the sample team (wearing sterile gloves, boots, hooded protective suits, and
powered air purifying respirators with P.100 cartridges) placed sampling devices in the locations indicated in Figure 1 and left
the suite to reduce air turbulence for the duration of the sample collection period. Following semiquiescent sampling, active
office conditions were simulated to reflect routine behaviors in a busy office environment (ie, paper handling, active foot traffic,
simulated mail sorting, moving trash containers, patting chairs). There was no activity in the office suite several days prior to or
between sampling periods. 

There are no validated environmental sampling or risk assessment methods for B anthracis contamination. Questions regarding
collection techniques, laboratory extraction efficiency from environmental media, and appropriate methods for air monitoring
remain unanswered. Accordingly, in this investigation a variety of environmental sampling methods were used to assess their
usefulness for estimating environmental exposure and risk from B anthracis spores. Samples and sample locations were based
on plausible exposure pathways (both inhalation and dermal) and were selected based on proximity to the original release,
pedestrian traffic patterns within the suite, representative exposures to the staff in the work area, and areas of interest for spore
transport within the office suite (eg, computer monitors). 

Environmental sampling methods included air monitoring with stationary and personal sampling devices (devices worn by the
sample team to characterize colony-forming unit [CFU] levels in their breathing zone) that actively collected spores from a
known volume of air as well as open blood agar plates that passively collected spores deposited from the Hart Senate Office
Building aerosol. Surface samples were collected to help characterize the presence of B anthracis contamination on a variety
of surface types using both microvacuum devices and sterile swabs. These environmental samples were collected under both
quiescent and active office conditions to assess the influence of human movement within the suite on environmental spore
concentrations.

Andersen 6-stage viable (microbial) particle-sizing samplers (Thermo-Andersen, Smyrna, Ga) were used to collect airborne
spores to evaluate concentrations and size ranges of spores or spore aggregates. Andersen samplers were operated for 10
minutes at an air flow rate of 28.3 L/min during each sample collection period. The Andersen sampler collects spores
according to nominal aerodynamic diameters on each of 6 vertically stacked agar plates. Andersen samplers use petri dishes
filled with 42 mL of agar to control aerodynamics of particle impact on plates according to manufacturer-specified cutoffs of
7.0, 4.7, 3.3, 2.1, 1.1, and 0.65 µm. For this investigation, 18 mL of 5% sheep blood agar (SBA) plates (Remel Inc, Lenexa,
Kan) were used for collection media. Use of reduced media volume resulted in an increase in the specified jet-to-plate distance
of 0.3 cm with a corresponding increase of 0.3 µm in the particle size cutpoints.6 Thus, the smallest particle impacting the
number 6 plate in the cascade would have a nominal diameter of 0.95 µm (ie, 0.65 µm + 0.3 µm). 

For the semiquiescent and the first active testing period, 2 viable Andersen impact samplers (6-stage) were used; 1 was placed
on the floor in the vicinity of the original contamination and 1 was placed on the floor 20 feet away near the common entrance
to the suite (Figure 1). During the second active sampling period, the 2 Andersen samplers were placed at the breathing zone
level in the same locations, and a specially configured 2-stage Andersen sampler was placed at a floor location near the original
source zone. The final stage of this sampler was fitted with a glass fiber filter to trap any remaining viable spores smaller than
the final impact stage (approximately 0.9 µm). At the end of each sample collection period, Andersen samplers were
disinfected to avoid cross-contamination. 

Direct colony counts on SBA plates in the Anderson samplers were obtained and the positive hole correction method (Box)
was used to acquire a statistical probability count of CFUs (Table 2). 

In addition to stationary air samples, personal air samples were collected from the breathing zone of sample team members
during all 3 rounds of sampling. Sample pumps were calibrated to operate at a flow rate of 4 L/min. The flow rate was not
intended to simulate respiratory minute ventilation but to provide efficient deposition of spores on the collection media.
Collection media consisted of gelatin filters placed in 37-mm open-faced filter cassettes and located in breathing zones of team
members for each sampling period. These cassettes are commonly used for personal air monitoring applications and were
available with corresponding gelatin inserts conducive to the collection and direct incubation of microbial samples. Sample
cassettes were placed on the front of the team members' suits just below the shoulder and connected to a sampling pump worn
at the waist by a length of Tygon tubing (Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation, Akron, Ohio). 

Open plates were placed in workstations, on the floor, and within the stairway to estimate spore settling during and following
various levels of human activity in the suite. Seventeen SBA plates were placed in various locations and at various heights
throughout the office during the semiquiescent and the first active sampling period. Ten plates were placed on office chairs, 3 at
various floor locations, and 4 on the steps of an internal office stairway (Figure 1). Plates were opened for 45 minutes to
collect viable spores then closed and wrapped with parafilm. 

A total of 17 surface samples were collected on fabric office dividers, carpets, paper files, and near the source of the original
contamination. A microvacuum sampler was used to quantify the surface loading of B anthracis on a variety of surface types.
Microvacuum samples were collected using personal air monitoring pumps operated at a calibrated flow rate of 4 L/min. Filter
cowls containing gelatin filters with a nominal pore size of 3 µm (having submicron retention efficiencies) were connected to the
pump with tubing to form a microvacuum device. Sampled areas were defined by a 100-cm2 template, then vacuumed using a
slow back and forth motion first in one direction, and then perpendicular to the original direction. Microvacuum samples were
collected at workstations in 5 different office areas during the second active sampling period. 

Swab samples were used to assess the presence of B anthracis contamination on an additional 12 surfaces. Sterile nylon
swabs moistened with sterile water were used to sample both vertical and horizontal surfaces as defined by 100-cm2
templates. Areas were swabbed in perpendicular directions using a slowly progressing S-shaped motion and then placed in
sterile 15-mL tubes. Nine swab samples were collected for both the semiquiescent and first active sampling periods: 3 vertical
semigloss latex painted surfaces (2 doors and 1 wall), 3 computer monitors, and 3 individual mailboxes. 

Aseptic handling techniques were used throughout the sampling and analytical process. All samples were labeled immediately
following collection using predetermined sample codes. Samples were placed in individual resealable bags and immediately
shipped to the analytical laboratory with blind identification codes and under chain-of-custody. Field blank samples
(quality-control samples used to ensure adherence to sterile microbiologic technique) were included at a frequency of 10%. 

Samples were evaluated for the presence of viable B anthracis at the Naval Medical Research Center in Silver Spring, Md.
Gelatin filters were removed from the filter cassettes and placed directly on SBA plates. Swabs and glass fiber filters were
macerated in 3.0 and 7.5 mL, respectively, of sterile phosphate-buffered saline for approximately 1 minute to free viable
spores. Following maceration, a 1.0-mL aliquot of each sample was removed and heat shocked at 65°C for 15 minutes to
reduce viable vegetative bacteria in the sample. A 200-µL aliquot of each heated sample was spread on an SBA plate and
plates were incubated at 37°C for 14 hours. Following incubation, bacterial colonies morphologically consistent with B
anthracis were counted and recorded. Rapid real-time polymerase chain reaction assays were used to confirm the identity of
suspect B anthracis colonies.8, 9 At least 1 suspect colony from each plate was tested for the presence of the genetic markers
pag and cyaB, specific to the virulence plasmids pXO1 and pXO2, respectively. Following polymerase chain reaction
confirmation of selected suspect colonies, the number of B anthracis colonies on each plate was reported. Analyse-It
Software version 1.64 (Analyse-It Software Ltd, Leeds, England) was used for statistical analyses and P<.05 was considered
significant. All sample team members were specially trained in response to extremely hazardous environments and all
participation was voluntary. The US Federal Incident Command System reviewed and approved the study. Incident Command
System is a system used to organize and manage participating groups during emergency response situations. 
 

RESULTS 
 

Results for the 6-stage Andersen air samples are presented in Table 2. Positive hole correction results are presented below
where applicable. Comparison of floor samples between semiquiescent and active conditions showed an increase in viable
spore collection across all sampler stages at both the mail area (48 vs >3006 total CFUs) and entrance area (71 vs 204 total
CFUs) locations. In the mail area, stationary Andersen breathing zone samples showed an increase compared with
semiquiescent sampling taken previously at floor level (200 vs 48 total CFUs). Estimated airborne spore concentrations
collected near the floor over a 10-minute period ranged from 171 to 251 CFUs/m3 during the semiquiescent period. For the
active period, airborne CFU concentrations ranged from 721 to more than 11 000 and 106 to 707 CFUs/m3 for floor and
breathing zone samples, respectively. This represents as much as a 65-fold increase in CFUs under active conditions
compared with semiquiescent conditions. Approximately half of the CFUs had corrected nominal diameters ranging from 1.4
to 2.4 µm, with more than 80% ranging from 0.95 to 3.5 µm. Results from the 2-stage Andersen sampler indicated no viable
spores less than a corrected nominal diameter of 0.95 µm. 

Locations and results of viable colony counts on the 17 open SBA plates (10 on chairs; 7 on the floor) collected during
semiquiescent and active periods are shown in Figure 1. During the semiquiescent period, 5 of the 17 plates were positive for
B anthracis (median, 0 CFU; range, 1-3 CFUs; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0-1). In comparison, 14 of 15 plates (1 plate
was left in the suite and was desiccated beyond use) during the first active sampling period were positive for B anthracis
(median, 15 CFUs; range, 4-80 CFUs; 95% CI, 11-28) illustrating a significant increase in colony counts (P<.001; using a
2-tailed nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test). 

Results of personal air monitor samples collected from team members during each of the sampling periods are presented in
Table 3. Filters from all 10 of the samples were positive for B anthracis. Results were positive for B anthracis during
semiquiescent office conditions (mean, 4 CFUs; range, 1-7 CFUs) and increased during active office conditions (mean, 14
CFUs; range, 1-36 CFUs). There was a significant increase in the number of CFUs collected on personal air samples during
the second active test period (P = .01; 1-tailed paired t test with 2 df) but not the first active test period (P = .17) when
compared with the semiquiescent sampling period. A 1-tailed statistical test was used with the expectation that the number of
airborne viable CFUs would increase (rather than decrease) when activity increased in the suite. 

Six of the 9 surface swab samples taken during the semiquiescent and first active period were positive; 3 vertical mailbox
surfaces (range, 3-43 CFUs) and 3 computer screens (range, 2-150 CFUs), with little change in viable spore counts in
response to increased activity. Three swab samples collected from vertical wall surfaces during each sampling period were
negative. During the second active sampling period, sequential swab samples of a computer monitor screen sampled in the off,
then on position, resulted in a 25-fold increase in viable colony counts on the charged screen. Deposition of spores on the
charged monitor may indicate influence of electrostatic effects on spore behavior. 

Additionally, 5 microvacuum samples were taken in different office areas during the second period of activity to evaluate
contamination of different types of surfaces (Table 4). Although microvacuum samples showed substantial viable spore
contamination of carpeted and smooth horizontal surfaces, very little contamination of vertical fabric workstation dividers or the
tops of paper files was found. No CFUs were found on the field blanks collected from any of the sample types during the
course of the investigation. 
 

COMMENT 
 

The importance of secondary aerosolization of B anthracis spores associated with a bioterrorism attack has been discussed
by a number of researchers.10-14 However, few empirical data existed to allow for scientifically based public health conclusions
or recommendations. Although research conducted by the military has shown that Bacillus subtilis spores, used as a surrogate
for B anthracis, can reaerosolize with varying activities in outdoor environments,13, 15 until now, no published data have been
available concerning secondary aerosolization of B anthracis spores indoors. Prior to the attacks in the fall of 2001, consensus
recommendations from the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense11 suggested only a slight risk of acquiring inhalational
anthrax by secondary reaerosolization from heavily contaminated surfaces. These recommendations were based on an incident
involving accidental release of B anthracis in Sverdlovsk, Russia,5 occupational studies of workers in goat hair processing
mills,16 and modeling analyses by the US Army.12 The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense recognized that its
recommendations were based on interpretation and extrapolation from an incomplete knowledge base and needed to be
regularly reassessed as new information becomes available.11 A recent reassessment by the consensus group includes a
precautionary note regarding reaerosolization of B anthracis spores based, in part, on work presented here.17 

This investigation presents empirical findings concerning secondary aerosolization of viable B anthracis spores following a
bioterrorism incident indoors. Among the limitations of the work are the severe schedule constraints, limited availability of
equipment, and the extreme conditions under which the investigation was planned and implemented. Both empirically observed
and substantially increased spore concentrations were recorded on open SBA plates during active conditions in the office suite.
Elevations of CFUs recorded on personal air monitoring devices during active vs semiquiescent office conditions are consistent
with military investigations showing activity-related increases in airborne spore exposures outdoors.13 However, the personal
air monitor data reported in this study are limited due to high variability and small sample size. 

During simulated activities, airborne concentrations of viable B anthracis spores within the office ranged from 2 to 86
CFUs/m3 for personal air monitors and 100 to more than 11 000 CFUs/m3 for stationary Andersen samples, with more than
80% of the spores falling into the respirable range (<5 µm). Relatively higher collection efficiencies on stationary monitors may
be due to sample locations within the contaminated suite, higher air flow rates through the stationary sampling devices, or the
sample team personal monitors integrating exposure over both contaminated and noncontaminated areas of the Hart Senate
Office Building (personal monitors were activated on entry to the building 6 floors below the contaminated suite). 

Using a mean (SD) respiratory rate of 1.38 m3/h (0.66) reported for office workers,18 estimated inhalation exposures to B
anthracis in the breathing zone were 119 and 250 CFUs/h for personal air monitors and breathing zone Andersen samplers,
respectively. Based on CFU concentrations recorded by floor level Andersen samplers, estimated exposures were as high as
15 000 CFUs/h. Additionally, findings of airborne B anthracis spores during the initial semiquiescent sampling period suggest
that even minimal movements may result in resuspension of viable spores. These findings were recorded almost a month
following the original incident, despite the removal of the contaminated letter from the suite. 

Determining the magnitude of inhalational risks from reaerosolized B anthracis spores is uncertain. Reliable human data on the
minimum infective dose for inhalational B anthracis is lacking. Individual susceptibility, virulence of the strain, and spore
physical characteristics may all have profound impacts on the dose necessary to cause inhalational anthrax.3, 4 Primate model
extrapolations suggest an estimated human median lethal dose between 2500 and 55 000 spores,10 with the highest infectivity
associated with clouds of single spores, vs multispore aggregates.4 Recent primate studies have demonstrated inhalational
infectivity of B anthracis following exposure to only a few spores.19 Human cases of inhalational anthrax have also been
reported involving minimal exposures.16 Risk predictions indicate that infective doses may be as low as 1 to 3 spores14 and
these predictions may be reflected in the 2 cases of inhalational anthrax in New York and Connecticut still under
investigation.20 

This work clearly demonstrates a potential for secondary aerosolization of viable B anthracis spores originating from
contaminated surfaces in an indoor environment. As a result, precautions to protect exposed decontamination workers and
area occupants are indicated. 
 

Author/Article Information 
 

Author Affiliations: US Environmental Protection Agency National Enforcement Investigations Center, Denver Federal
Center, Denver, Colo (Dr Weis); US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Md (Mr Intrepido and Ms Cowin); US Public Health Service, Denver, Colo (Dr Miller); US Environmental
Protection Agency Region 5, Cleveland Office, Westlake, Ohio (Mr Durno); and Naval Medical Research Center, Biological
Defense Directorate, Silver Spring, Md (Drs Gebhardt and Bull). 

Corresponding Author and Reprints: Christopher P. Weis, PhD, US Environmental Protection Agency National
Enforcement Investigations Center, Denver Federal Center, Bldg 53, PO Box 25227, Denver, CO 80225 (e-mail:
weis.chris@epa.gov). 

Author Contributions: Study concept and design: Weis, Miller, Durno. 

Acquisition of data: Weis, Intrepido, Miller, Cowin, Durno, Gebhardt, Bull. 

Analysis and interpretation of data: Weis, Intrepido, Miller, Cowin, Durno, Gebhardt, Bull. 

Drafting of the manuscript: Weis, Intrepido, Miller, Cowin. 

Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content: Weis, Miller, Durno, Gebhardt, Bull. 

Statistical expertise: Weis, Miller. 

Obtained funding: Weis. 

Administrative, technical, or material support: Weis, Intrepido, Miller, Cowin, Durno, Gebhardt, Bull. 

Study supervision: Weis, Durno, Gebhardt, Bull. 

Funding/Support: Funding and/or resources for this investigation were provided by the participating federal agencies. 

Disclaimer: The views, opinions, assertions, and findings contained herein are those of the authors and should not be
construed as official US agency policies or decisions unless so designated by other documentation. Any reference to products
or methods does not constitute an endorsement of those products or methods by the authors or by the US federal government.
 

Acknowledgment: In support of this work, we graciously acknowledge the US Capitol Police for their hospitality, sample
transport, and site security during the incident; the Capitol Hill Incident Commander for spirited leadership and endless
encouragement; US Architect of the Capitol for providing tireless engineering and architectural advice; US Environmental
Protection Agency management and especially the EPA On-Scene Coordinators; Bill Daniels, MS, CIH, CSP, of the US
Public Health Service for invaluable advice on sampling, study design, and detailed editorial recommendations; Chris Ansell,
MS, of Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine for assisting with project logistics; and the laboratory technicians
at Naval Medical Research Center for many hours of analysis. 

Box. Positive Hole Correction Method 

The positive hole correction method determines a statistical probablility count of colony-forming units. It represents a count of
the jets that delivered the spores to the agar plates and the conversion of the jet number to a particle count by using the
"positive hole" conversion formula7: 
 

where Pr is the expected number of viable particulates to produce r positive holes and N is the total number of holes per stage
(400). This formula is based on the principle that as the number of viable particles being impinged on a given plate increases,
the probability of the next particle going into an unpenetrated hole decreases. Thus, when 9 of 10 of the holes have each
received 1 or more particles, the next particle has but 1 chance in 10 of going into an unpenetrated hole. Therefore, on
average, 10 additional particles would be required to increase the number of positive holes by 1. 

(Return to text.) 
 

REFERENCES 

1. 
Parker JS. 
Terrorism through the mail: protecting the postal workers and the public. 
Report submitted to the Committee on Governmental Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and
Federal Service, October 31, 2001. Available at: http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/103101parker.htm. Accessibility
verified October 22, 2002. 

2. 
Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Dalldorf FG. 
Industrial inhalation anthrax. 
Bacteriol Rev. 
1966;30:646-659. 
MEDLINE 

3. 
Watson A, Keir D. 
Information on which to base assessments of risk from environments contaminated with anthrax spores. 
Epidemiol Infect. 
1994;113:479-490. 
MEDLINE 

4. 
Druett HA, Henderson DW, Packman L, Peacock S. 
Studies on respiratory infection, I: the influence of particle size on respiratory infection with anthrax spores. 
J Hyg (Lond). 
1953;51:359-371. 

5. 
Meselson M, Guillemin J, Hugh-Jones M, et al. 
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Science. 
1994;266:1202-1208. 
MEDLINE 

6. 
Marple VA, Rubow KL. 
In: Lodge JP, Chan, TL, eds. 
Cascade Impactor: Sampling and Data Analysis. 
Akron, Ohio: American Industrial Hygiene Association; 1986:79. 

7. 
Feller W. 
An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications. 
New York, NY: Wiley; 1950:324. 

8. 
Livak KJ, Flood SJ, Marmaro J, Giusti W, Deetz, K. 
Oligonucleotides with fluorescent dyes at opposite ends provide a quenched probe system useful for detecting PCR product
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PCR Methods Appl. 
1995;4:357-362. 
MEDLINE 

9. 
Heid CA, Stevens J, Livak KJ, Williams PM. 
Real time quantitative PCR. 
Genome Res. 
1996;6:986-994. 
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Keim M, Kauffman AF. 
Principles for emergency response to bioterrorism. 
Ann Emerg Med. 
1999;34:177-182. 
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11. 
Inglesby TV, Henderson DA, Bartlett JG, et al. 
Anthrax as a biological weapon: medical and public health management. 
JAMA. 
1999;281:1735-1745. 

12. 
Chinn KS. 
Reaerosolization Hazard Assessment for Biological Agent Contaminated Hardstand Areas. 
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah: US Dept of the Army; 1996. 

13. 
Resnick IG, Martin DD, Larsen LD. 
Evaluation of Need for Detection of Surface Biological Agent Contamination. 
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah: US Dept of the Army; 1990. 

14. 
Patrick WC. 
Risk Assessment of Biological Warfare Primary and Secondary Aerosols and Their Requirements for Decontamination.

Vienna, Va: Science Applications International Corp; 1999. 

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Davids DE, Lejeune AR. 
Secondary Aerosol Hazard in the Field. 
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16. 
Brachman PS. 
Inhalation anthrax. 
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Inglesby TV, O'Toole T, Henderson DA, et al. 
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Linn WS, Spier CE, Hackney JD. 
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J Clean Technol Environ Sci. 
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Peters CJ, Hartley DM. 
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Barakat LA, Quentzel HL, Jernigan JA, et al. 
Fatal inhalational anthrax in a 94-year-old Connecticut woman. 
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Thursday, December 12, 2002

WASHINGTON — The FBI is conducting an "evidentiary" search on public land in Frederick, Md., that was the focus of the government's anthrax investigation earlier this year, Fox News has learned.

Frederick, about 45 minutes north of Washington, D.C., was once the home of Steven Hatfill, a 48-year-old biochemist who is considered a "person of interest" in the anthrax case. Hatfill worked at the Fort Detrick Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases -- the primary custodian of the Ames strain of anthrax found in the letters last fall -- until 1999.

One law enforcement source told Fox News that Thursday's search is indeed related to the Hatfill saga.

The anthrax investigation began last year after letters laced with the deadly bacteria were sent to several Capitol Hill lawmakers and news organizations. Five people died after being exposed to the white powder.

Hatfill is the only "person of interest" whose name has come to public light in the longstanding investigation. Hatfill has vehemently denied any role in the anthrax mailings. His former apartment in Frederick and the storage facilities he rented in Florida have been searched multiple times.

"I am not the anthrax killer," Hatfill said in August as he lashed out against Attorney General John Ashcroft for calling him a "person of interest" in the investigation.

Hatfill allowed the release of the results of his blood test and said he has also offered to compare his handwriting to that appearing on the anthrax letters.

The FBI Baltimore and Washington field offices also issued a statement on Thursday's search. It reads:

"The FBI is conducting forensic searches on public land located within the City of Frederick, Maryland. The searches are in connection with an ongoing criminal investigation. It is important to note that based on water, soil and sediment testing already conducted, there is no indication of any risk to the public health or safety."

Hatfill's publicist, Pat Clawson, told Fox News this was the first he had heard of the situation and that he's looking into the activity. Hatfill has not lived in his Frederick apartment since Aug. 12.

The FBI has said in the past that Hatfill is no more or less important than about 30 fellow scientists and researchers with the expertise and opportunity to conduct the attacks.

Hatfill was fired Sept. 3 from a job at Louisiana State University after the Justice Department sent his supervisor an e-mail ordering that Hatfill be barred from working on department-funded projects.

Fox News' Ian McCaleb contributed to this report

From the Science & Technology Desk
Published 12/12/2002 3:39 PM

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 (UPI) -- The FBI said Thursday that it is searching land in Frederick, Md., in relation to an ongoing criminal investigation that may be related to the anthrax attack that killed five people over a year ago.

A spokesman for Steven Hatfill, who was called a "person of interest" in the investigation into the anthrax attacks, said the former U.S. Army scientist had received calls from the media asking about a possible link with the latest searches.

"Apparently they are searching some kind of a public park near Fort Detrick up there," said Patrick Clawson, Hatfill's spokesman. Media questions, he said, have focused on a connection between Hatfill and the park.

"We don't know anything about it," Clawson said, adding, "Steve has had no contact with the FBI for several weeks."

The FBI continues to talk to Hatfill periodically and follow him, Clawson said.

The U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington and FBI field offices in Washington and Baltimore took part in the search.

A statement from the FBI Washington office said the bureau was conducting forensic searches.

"It is important to note that, based on water, soil and sediment testing already conducted, there is no indication of any risk to the public health or the public safety," the statement said. 

Copyright © 2002 United Press International

FBI agents searched a wooded area in the Catoctin Mountains northwest of Frederick on Thursday, apparently seeking evidence in the government's anthrax investigation.

The search was centered near two small ponds in the City of Frederick watershed area. Agents shut down a 3-mile stretch of Gambrill Park Road as they moved tents, lights and other equipment into the area.

Officials said the road will be closed for several days as the search continues.

The agency refused to say what it was looking for.

"The FBI is conducting forensic searches," Special Agent Chris Murray said in a news release. 

"The searches are in connection with an ongoing criminal investigation," his statement said.

In a hint that the search was related to the government's ongoing anthrax investigation, Mr. Murray said, "It is important to note that based on water, soil and sediment testing already conducted, there is no indication of any risk to the public health or public safety."

The heavily-wooded site is about 10 miles northwest of Frederick, and about 7 miles southwest of Thurmont.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Channing Phillips would not say whether Thursday's search was related to the investigation involving Dr. Steven Hatfill, a bioterrorism expert formerly based at Fort Detrick.

Dr. Hatfill has been called one of about 20 "persons of interest" in the government's anthrax probe.

"It would be inappropriate for me to say anything beyond what the advisory says. No one has been charged with a crime," Mr. Phillips said.

Mr. Phillips said the search had been planned for some time, refusing to be more specific.

The FBI operation apparently included both an excavation in a clearing and a search of the ponds. ABC News reported that divers were going to look for laboratory equipment that may have been thrown in the waters.

The Associated Press said one FBI agent had been at the scene of the search since Monday, an indication that the probe began several days ago. Eva Rosvold, an aide to Frederick Mayor Jennifer Dougherty, told AP that the FBI had been talking "all week" with Police Chief Kim C. Dine about its work. She said the FBI was to brief the mayor and police chief this morning.

Dr. Hatfill's home in Frederick, in an apartment complex near Fort Detrick, was searched twice last summer.

Dr. Hatfill, who now lives in the Washington area, worked for Fort Detrick's U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases until 1999.  The agency is the primary custodian of the virulent Ames strain of anthrax found in the anthrax letters.

In several public statements, Dr. Hatfill has denied any involvement in the anthrax attacks, which killed five people and infected 18 others. Thousands more were put on preventive antibiotics as a precaution.

After Dr. Hatfill left Fort Detrick, he worked at Louisiana State University.  But the Justice Department sent a letter Sept. 3 asking LSU to "cease and desist" using Dr. Hatfill as an expert or course instructor.

Dr. Hatfill's lawyer in Alexandria, Va., Victor Glasberg, declined comment Thursday. "I know nothing about it, zero about it," he said.

Fort Detrick spokeswoman Eileen Mitchell said representatives of the base were not notified about the investigation.

Residents along the winding roadway in the watershed area reported seeing a large FBI evidence collection van make its way up the mountain about 10:30 a.m. Thursday, followed by dozens of unmarked police vehicles.

Vehicles at the site included large enclosed trailers, a white Ryder truck, sport utility vehicles, at least four six-wheeled all-terrain vehicles and a bus-sized vehicle.

At least two tents were erected. Equipment that appeared to include a generator or heating unit was linked to one of the tents by large hoses. 

Portable toilets were stationed along Gambrill Park Road.

Vehicles continued to come and go for hours.

Agents closed Gambrill Park Road to traffic between Delauter and Tower roads, some of them wearing hardhats to protect themselves from falling shards of melting ice.

The agents stationed at the roadblocks said the road would be closed for the day and referred all questions to the field offices.

Charles Bailey, a resident of the area, said he was disturbed that agents would not tell people why the investigators were there.

"There are all these agents up here, and they won't tell me why," Mr. Bailey said.

"I'm not paranoid, but there's been all this talk about dirty bombs, and with Camp David being so close, I know there's a lot of wackos out there," he said.

The presidential mountain retreat is just more than 5 miles from the search site.

Orley Bourland, who was the plant manager of a Detrick anthrax production facility in the 1950s, said that if the agents were looking for the deadly microbe, rain and snow would have diluted the germ to render it harmless.

"I would not be worried about it at all," said Mr. Bourland of Walkersville.

Even so, Mr. Bailey remained upset.

"What's happening here is happening in my neighborhood. All I want to know is, 'Do I have a reason to lock my doors?'" 

For a second day Friday, FBI agents investigating last year's deadly anthrax attacks searched the area around two small ponds in the Frederick Watershed, keeping mum about the target of their probe.

From his Baltimore office, Special Agent Barry Maddox said no timeframe had been established for when the army of agents will leave the wooded Catoctin Mountains site they are excavating.

"As the investigation moves along, the agents will take it wherever it leads. No exact date has been set," Mr. Maddox said.

The FBI spokesman responded to most questions with replies of "I don't know."

However, he switched to a "can't comment" in reply to a question that the watershed search is connected to an unpublished novel written by Dr. Steven Hatfill, a former Fort Detrick scientist considered a "person of interest" in the anthrax case.

The 1998 novel centers on a terror scheme to spread deadly bacteria in  Washington but does not involve anthrax or mailings, published reports said.

Later, Mr. Maddox responded "can't comment" again, to a question about whether the tip that led FBI agents to the area off of Gambrill Park Road referred to "twin ponds" located side by side.

Officials have acknowledged that divers have been searching the frigid waters for evidence linked to the anthrax attacks. But they won't say what, if anything, has been found.

As for how close investigators are to filing charges, "not close," Mr. Maddox said.

The agency's silence Friday was in sharp contrast to a deluge of statements made by Pat Clawson of Berryville, Va., a spokesman for Dr. Hatfill.

"This is kangaroo court type of stuff," Mr. Clawson said of the latest search directly or indirectly linked to his friend, now unemployed and living in Washington.

Dr. Hatfill's Frederick apartment just outside the gate to Fort Detrick was searched June 25, Aug. 1 and Sept. 11, Mr. Clawson said, adding that the first two searches were done voluntarily.

"The FBI blew this investigation from day one. What has happened to Steve Hatfill should be offensive to every American," Mr. Clawson said.

"Tomorrow it could be you. Next week, it will be your neighbor. Three weeks from now, it will be your baby sitter," he said.

Mr. Clawson said the Justice Department's scrutiny of his friend "has been like a never-ending nightmare. Steve is very depressed and he is very angry that his career and reputation have been smeared. ... It's like he's radioactive. No one will hire him. His savings are just about gone."

Dr. Hatfill repeatedly has denied any involvement in the anthrax attacks, which killed five people and infected 18 others. Thousands more were put on preventive antibiotics as a precaution.

Mr. Clawson said, "The FBI can search the planet until hell freezes over, but it will find that Steve Hatfill was never involved in the anthrax attacks," he said.

Meanwhile, while the FBI remained tight-lipped with the media regarding their investigation, agents held a 40-minute briefing Friday morning at Frederick City Hall with Mayor Jennifer Dougherty and Police Chief Col. Kim Dine.

"What's important for the public to understand is that there is no threat to public safety and no indication of any problems with water contamination," Chief Dine said.

"They will continue to brief us on what they're doing as needed. We've been totally brought into the loop," he said.

FBI agents shift watershed search
By Sean Barry 
News-Post Staff 

The FBI continued its search Sunday in the Catoctin Mountains northwest of Frederick for clues in last year's anthrax attacks, as divers scoured two ponds near two others that were previously investigated.

FBI spokesman Chris Murray declined comment Sunday on what evidence, if any, has been found. He referred to a previous FBI statement acknowledging only a general connection to the anthrax letters.

"That's the extent of what we're going to say," he said.

Agents began searching the area in the Frederick municipal watershed Thursday, setting up tents and and unloading all-terrain vehicles from a fleet of trucks and evidence vans.

Gambrill Park Road between Tower and Delauter roads has been closed to the public. Only residents of the area are allowed passage.

"We're not going to inconvenience anyone," Mr. Murray said.

Asked if residents have been given any official orders or instructions, he said, "I don't know."

Angie Harris, who lives on the stretch of Gambrill Park Road closed to the public, said she has been issued no such directives.

Asked if she had been told to stay out of certain areas, Ms. Davis said, "They haven't said that at all. Then again, I haven't gone down and looked" at the evidence-gathering sites.

She said she hadn't been inconvenienced.

"We're not having any trouble at all," she said.

The FBI has given no indication how long their search will continue, or how many agents are involved.

News reports last week said the ponds are being searched for missing laboratory equipment.

A former Fort Detrick scientist, Steven Hatfill, has been identified as a "person of interest" in the anthrax investigation but has not been charged. 

Ex-Army scientist Steven Hatfill has been the recent focus in the investigation about who mailed anthrax-contaminated letters last year in and around the time of the September 11th terror attacks. But as the FBI returns to AMI headquarters in Florida, home to the National Enquirer and Sun tabloids and recipient of the first anthrax letter, the focus of the investigation may turn once again to identifying foreign terrorists as the likely culprits.

There remains the possibility that Atta and the hijackers are responsible for the Florida anthrax cases and that another person - perhaps Steven Hatfill or another insider/scientist - is responsible for the other anthrax letters. The suspect anthrax contaminated AMI letter, received on September 4th - one week before September 11th, reportedly bears little resemblance to anthrax contaminated letters postmarked after September 11th. The AMI letter has been described as a "weird love letter" to Jennifer Lopez that contained a star of David and a soapy powder. It was addressed to Lopez c/o The Sun Tabloids. Anthrax-contaminated letters sent after 9/11 to Senators Leahy and Daschle and to Tom Brokaw and the editor of the New York Post,
contained a sternly worded message that mentioned September 11th and Allah. The AMI letter was designed to be noticed. The other letters were designed to be nondescript until opened. However, a timeline of the anthrax mailings suggests that both parties (Atta and Hatfill/insider) could not have known about the other's plans and that two anthrax mailings conducted by two groups at the same time is highly unlikely. 

A review of this last year's news accounts of the Florida anthrax cases suggests that Mohamad Atta and his hijacker cohorts are probably responsible for the Florida anthrax cases. To believe that Atta and the hijackers were not responsible for the Florida anthrax cases one would have to discount and ignore a mountain of physical and circumstantial evidence. It appears that they were
planning an aerial dissemination of anthrax, but had to settle for letters after running out of time and experiencing difficulties in acquiring a crop duster and related necessary equipment. Below, is just some of the evidence as reported by major news organizations. There's much more: Search google.com or other search engines and news organizations for more information. Use keywords such as "Atta", "anthrax", "Florida", and "AMI".

AMI, known for the National Enquirer and Sun tabloids and sight of the first anthrax fatality, is within two miles of the Delray Racquet Club, where some of the terrorists stayed in the months before the hijackings and is about 12 miles from the Lantana airport, where Atta flew a light airplane that he rented on four separate occasions in August.

Several of the hijackers rented an apartment from a real estate agent who is the wife of the Sun’s editor, Mike Irish. The hijackers were known to be conducting business and "hanging out" within miles of the AMI building. Hatfill has no known connections to Delray Beach, but the hijackers sure did!

ABC News reports: "Mohamed Atta, a suspected ringleader in the recent terror attacks in New York and Washington, made repeated visits to a crop-dusting airfield in Florida, according to Willie Lee, the chief pilot and general manager of South Florida Crop Care in Belle Glade. 

Lee identified Atta to the FBI, telling agents the suspected hijacker came to the airfield as recently as the Saturday before the Sept. 11 attacks, asking questions about the capabilities of crop-dusters, including how big a load of chemicals they could carry. 

Atta was "very persistent about wanting to know how much the airplane will haul, how fast it will go, what kind of range it has," Lee told ABCNEWS. 

"The guy kept trying to get in the airplane," Lee added, saying his ground crew chief had to order Atta away from one of the planes at one point because he kept trying to climb onto the wing and into the cockpit. 

Lee said Atta and as many as 12 or 15 other men appearing to be of Middle Eastern descent visited the airfield in groups of two or three on several weekends prior to the attacks, often taking pictures of the aircraft."

Washington Post reports: "In the waning hours of Operation Desert Fox in 1998, a British missile sheared off the top of a military hangar in southern Iraq and exposed a closely guarded secret. Plainly visible in the rubble was a new breed of Iraqi drone aircraft -- one that defense analysts now believe was specially modified to spread deadly chemicals and germs. Up to a dozen of the unmanned airplanes were spotted inside the hangar, each fitted with spray nozzles and wing-mounted tanks that could carry up to 80 gallons of liquid anthrax. If flown at low altitudes under the right conditions, a single drone could unleash a toxic cloud engulfing several city blocks, a top British defense official concluded. He dubbed them 'drones of death.'" - Atta's plans for crop dusting suspiciously mirror Iraqi efforts. Was Atta planning to use the crop dusters himself for a stash of anthrax he had, or was he acquiring intelligence about crop dusting that he was sending back to Baghdad?

CBS News reports: "Barely two weeks before his arrest, accused Sept. 11 plotter Zacarias Moussaoui," (the so-called 20th hijacker) "inquired about the University of Minnesota's crop-dusting program, according to the St. Paul Pioneer Press. 

The newspaper reported Friday that Moussaoui e-mailed the university's Crookston campus on July 31, 2001, seeking information on a "short course you offer to become a crop duster (6 month, 1 years max.)."

It seems that Moussaoui and Atta had some type of substance they were planning to deliver from a crop duster. It's not like they were going to do Florida a public service and spray for mosquitoes. That one can suspect the substance was anthrax rests in the following pieces of evidence:

The New York Times, as did many news organizations, reported the account of a Florida doctor who believes that he treated one of the hijackers for skin anthrax in June 2001. The eventual hijacker had an ugly, dark lesion on his leg and claimed that he got it from bumping into a suitcase months earlier. The antibiotic that the doctor prescribed was found in the hijacker's possessions, which led the FBI to the doctor. After reviewing the case, the doctor was certain that it was a case of skin (cutaneous) anthrax.

A pharmacist in Delray Beach, Florida said he told the FBI that two of the hijackers, Mohamad Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, came into the pharmacy looking for something to treat skin lesions (anthrax?) on Atta's hands. 

A note about FBI profiles: FBI profilers are sometimes asked to do the impossible.  That's the case with the anthrax mailer profile. In the anthrax case, all they have to work with are short notes that contains little more than "YOU DIE NOW", "DEATH TO AMERICA", "DEATH TO ISRAEL", and "ALLAH IS GREAT". (Somehow, the FBI profilers have discerned that the culprit is an American scientist?!) Such was the case in the mid-west pipe bombing case. A short note led FBI profilers to declare that the bomber was an older gentleman who was "set in his ways". The bomber turned out to be Luke Helder, a young college-age kid who was a member of a grunge rock band. Given just tidbits of information, FBI profilers have developed some uncanny profiles
that have helped catch a good number of criminals. However, in the anthrax case, FBI profilers simply do not have enough information (if you discount the obvious) to develop a valid profile that can help focus the investigation. Until further evidence is obtained, the focus needs to be on people who wish "death to America and Israel" and think that "Allah is great".

FBI: Hijacker-anthrax link coincidental
CNN - October 15, 2001 Posted: 11:42 AM EDT (1542 GMT)

BOCA RATON, Florida (CNN) -- In what the FBI calls a strange coincidence, two
apartments used by suspected hijackers named in the September 11 terrorist attacks
were rented to them by a real estate agent married to the editor of the tabloid
newspaper where an employee died from anthrax.

One Possible Anthrax Scenario:
It's possible that the 9/11 hijackers are responsible for the Florida anthrax case and an American scientist/insider is responsible for the other cases. 

By Tom Wakefield, PostalMag.com

Remember the scene in the movie Three Kings (about the Persian Gulf War) where USA Sergeant Troy Barlow (Marky Mark Wahlberg) is being interrogated by Said, a young captain in the Iraqi guard? Said, having attached electrodes to Troy's head, begins the interrogation by asking, "What is the problem with Michael Jackson?" Troy doesn't have the answer Said is looking for. Said continues: "He's Pop King of sick fucking country." I imagine that's what Mohamad Atta and his cohort hijackers were thinking when they mailed an anthrax-laced letter to AMI  -headquarters of the National Enquirer and Sun tabloids. - "They (AMI) are Media Kings of sick fucking country."

The anthrax letter that is suspected of contaminating the AMI building and killing one worker has been described as "a weird love letter" to Jennifer Lopez that contained a soapy powder and a Star of David pendant. It was addressed to J. Lopez, C/O the Sun tabloids. The AMI tabloids, in many aspects, mirrors the sick, seamy side of American culture. The tabloids are filled with squalid stories about J Lo, O.J., Bill Clinton, Michael Jackson and other famous and infamous media stars. To Muslim suicide bombers on a holy mission in the land of the Great Satan, AMI would represent the perfect representational target. I can just see the hijacker/anthrax mailers now, sitting
in their apartment saying "yeah, and we'll address it to J Lo and we'll throw in a Star of David - that'll get the letter noticed."

Not too many people realize that this letter was probably mailed on September 3rd in the Boca Raton, Florida area - home to AMI and some of the hijackers. It was received at AMI on September 4th, exactly one week before the September 11th terror attacks.  Ex-Army scientist Steven Hatfill of course did not know of the September 11th terror attacks on September 3rd and 4th, so he or another insider/scientist more than likely did not mail this letter. All signs, however, point to the hijackers who lived in the area. 

The other anthrax letters, sent to Senators Leahy and Daschle and to Tom Brokaw and the editor of the New York Post, were mailed at least a week after 9/11. These letters were much different than the noticeable J Lo letter. These letters contained sternly worded messages that mentioned September 11th, death to America and Israel, and Allah.

The anthrax investigation (Amerithrax) has been a frustrating one for the FBI and Postal Inspectors. Part of the frustration lies in the differences between the Florida letter and the letters mailed in New Jersey to addresses in Washington and New York. When one looks at the New Jersey aspect of the investigation alone, it appears that the leading suspect would be a "government insider". But when investigators try to tie it into the Florida case the evidence just doesn't meld. The same goes for the Florida aspect when investigators try to tie it in to the New Jersey mailings.

It's probable that the Florida letter was mailed by the hijackers. Moreover, it's possible, and I only say possible, that Steven Hatfill or another insider/scientist mailed the New Jersey anthrax letters coincidentally without knowing that another anthrax letter had been mailed by the hijackers. (The Florida letter wasn't discovered to have been contaminated with anthrax until the first week in October, a week or two after the first New Jersey letters were sent.) This improbable but possible coincidence may be the reason why the investigation has gone in circles.

An FBI profile of the anthrax mailer paints the portrait of a government-connected scientist who is actually highly patriotic - calculatingly deranged, but nevertheless patriotic. Here's the scenario I imagine in Steven Hatfill's (or another insider/scientist's) world. In the week after September 11th, this Insider is sitting at home watching news of the terror aftermath. Like many patriotic Americans, this Insider was probably enraged at what he saw and wanted revenge. The Insider, remembering that he had once secreted a vial of anthrax out of a lab, got an idea. (Having a bit of anthrax was an elixir of power to this person. The Insider decided that he would use his power for
the greater good.) He wanted the Islamics to pay for what they had done and he wanted to make sure that the government and American people were sufficiently riled up enough to follow through on justice and revenge. So the Insider crafted a couple of letters with rhetoric that was sure to elicit rage and revenge:

YOU CANNOT STOP US
WE HAVE THIS ANTHRAX
YOU DIE NOW
ARE YOU AFRAID?
DEATH TO AMERICA.
DEATH TO ISRAEL.
ALLAH IS GREAT

THIS IS NEXT
TAKE PENACILIN NOW
DEATH TO AMERICA
DEATH TO ISRAEL
ALLAH IS GREAT

It worked. Within months the Taliban and al Qaeda had been "bombed back to the Stone Age".

Frederick Mayor Jennifer Dougherty said she's getting regular reports from police Chief Kim Dine on the FBI's investigation in the Catoctin Mountains, but the city does not know exactly what the federal agents are searching for.

Ms. Dougherty said Chief Dine has been updating her several times a day and has been "in regular contact with the FBI" since they set up shop in the woods about 10 miles northwest of Frederick.

She said at a Tuesday morning press conference that she doesn't "have an expectation of being involved in the investigation. I don't know what they are looking for. The only thing we're hoping for is they clean up and leave the area in the same condition they found it."

Ms. Dougherty acknowledged the investigation is being coordinated by an anthrax team from Washington investigating last year's deadly anthrax mailings. She said the investigation may wrap up as early as today.

Chief Dine said he is happy with the communication between himself and the FBI.

"I've been brought in the loop from the beginning," he said. "I have been assured there are no issues of safety or threat to the water. They have been very cooperative and have been calling me every day."

Chief Dine said he visited the site of the investigation in the municipal watershed northwest of the city on Friday and was given free rein to see what the operation entailed. He could not say whether the FBI has informed him of exactly what they are looking for or what they have found.

Tuesday afternoon FBI Special Agent Barry Maddox said, "Everything is about the same. The investigation is ongoing but" the search in Frederick County "should be completed soon."

The Baltimore agent would not say what, if anything, has been recovered.

In Washington, FBI Special Agent Chris Murray declined to answer questions on the status of the investigation.

"I won't go beyond the statement we released last week," he said.

Last week's statement read, "The FBI is conducting forensic searches ... in connection with an ongoing criminal investigation. It is important to note that based on water, soil and sediment testing already conducted, there is no indication of any risk to the public health or public safety." 

Ms. Dougherty also said she has no reason to believe the city's water or soil has been affected, but that she would expect investigators to let the city know if they were at risk.

Kate Leckie contributed to this report. 

By Staff and Wire Reports 
News-Post Staff 
Friday, December 20, 2002

An FBI search of a wooded area atop Catoctin Mountain as part of the anthrax investigation appeared to be close to wrapping up Thursday.

Chris Murray, spokesman for the FBI's Washington field office, said agents were dismantling the operation that began last week and included divers who searched ponds for possible evidence.

Law enforcement officials have said the search was focused on information from a tipster that lab equipment may have been tossed into a pond.

Mr. Murray would not say whether any evidence was recovered.

The road block signs that previously prevented travel on a stretch of Gambrill Park Road north of Delauter Road now are gone. However, agents remained at the search site Thursday, preventing people from entering the search area.

Agents said they did not know when normal traffic will resume completely.

Late Thursday afternoon, a road block remained at Gambrill Park and Tower roads, preventing traffic from continuing onto Gambrill Park Road.

The search took place a few miles from the former home of Dr. Steven Hatfill, a scientist who once worked at the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick. That facility is the primary custodian of the virulent Ames strain of anthrax found in the letters that killed five people and infected others last year.

Dr. Hatfill has repeatedly denied any involvement in the attacks and said he never handled anthrax while an Army scientist. The Justice Department, however, continues to refer to Hatfill as a "person of interest" in the case. 

Newsmax Wires 
Tuesday, Dec. 24, 2002 

WASHINGTON -- Fifteen months after a series of anthrax-laced letters killed five Americans, the FBI again intensified its acknowledged interest in bio-war expert Stephen Hatfill, conducting a search of a Maryland state park and openly tracking him around Washington streets, despite emerging concern over their methods. 

Hatfill told United Press International in an interview last week that beginning on Dec. 17, shortly after the FBI completed a search of Gambrill State Park in Maryland believed linked to him, he was subjected to day and night surveillance by unmarked vans and cars. 

He said the agents had nearly run into his car at times as he drove on Washington's Beltway, following him during such mundane missions as meeting a friend to pick up a container of homemade soup. 

"The cars were on my bumper," Hatfill told UPI. 

Hatfill said he has no connection with the anthrax letters and has tried to cooperate with the investigation. He has not been charged with a crime or named a suspect or been called before a federal grand jury, but early last summer the FBI began making searches of his apartment in Rockville, Md., family storage space in Florida and the apartment of his girlfriend in the Washington area. The searches were highly publicized and the FBI was accused of leaking information on their efforts to the press. 

When asked at the time why the FBI was conducting these searches, a spokesman at their headquarters confirmed he was a "person of interest," to the bureau. Later Attorney General John Ashcroft used exactly the phrase in a news conference that was broadcast around the world. 

On Monday, the FBI field office in charge of the investigation declined to comment on whether Hatfill was still a "person of interest," or on the new surveillance of him and the search of the state park. 

Many former FBI agents and federal prosecutors claim that there is no legal meaning to the phrase "person of interest" within the FBI and that it unfairly raises suspicion about someone without evidence. In October, Sen. Charles Grassley, D-Iowa, inserted himself into the case asking the Justice Department what the phrase meant. 

An assistant attorney general at the Justice Department responded in a letter dated Nov. 4, 2002, that there was "no formal definition" for the term and that it is "commonly understood to refer to an individual whom law enforcement officials seek to question." 

The phrase was applied to Hatfill after he had had numerous voluntary interviews with the bureau, he and his associates pointed out. 

'Ruined My Life'

Hatfill claims the attention by the FBI has "ruined my life." He lost a $150,000 year job with a government contractor, he said, and an appointment to teach about defense against biological warfare at Louisiana State University. 

He also lost assignments to assist American government and military forces in defending themselves. He has been unemployed for four months and does not believe that he will be able to work in his field of defense against biological terrorism and attack. 

Hatfill said he has no idea why there has been a sudden resurgence of surveillance. Pat Clawson, a former television news reporter who has been assisting Hatfill, said he believes the surveillance is so obvious and so provocative that it amounts to harassment. 

On several separate evenings, Hatfill and Clawson said, a virtual caravan of cars set out behind Hatfill, some racing ahead while others kept on his bumper. Hatfill believes that his telephone is wiretapped and that the night he received a telephone invitation to meet a friend and get some fresh, homemade potato soup, the FBI agents heard the call and set out after him. 

He said he believes five cars followed him. He met his friend at a restaurant in Northern Virginia and had an ice tea. While he was in the restaurant two people came in who he believes were FBI agents. 

After he picked up the soup and started to leave, he said his friend approached a black Mustang with two men it and offered them his business card, but they refused to talk to him. Later in the evening, after Hatfill returned home, a surveillance car drove past his residence with a video camera openly pointed out the window. 

"That's not surveillance. That's harassment," said Clawson. 

At no time, Hatfill said, have any of these people identified themselves as law enforcement officers. 

The next night, Clawson approached several people sitting in cars near Hatfill's home and took pictures of their license plates. One woman sitting in her car said he could not take her picture. Later, Clawson said, a Washington Metropolitan Police car with plainclothes officers came by and told him he could not take photos without the woman's permission. 

Hatfill and others have said that the FBI has presented no evidence to him privately or in public that would link him and the anthrax-laced letters that were mailed to Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy and members of the news media. 

Last year, the FBI publicly issued a profile that they had formed of who might have perpetrated the anthrax attacks. Profiling has been severely criticized in several other cases. Hatfill's supporters say the profile does not match Hatfill in several significant features and without any forensic evidence or witness testimony implicating him, the attention to him is unjust.

NORFOLK -- A shipment of anthrax-contaminated waste will be brought to Norfolk by week's end to be incinerated. 

The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality announced Monday that it had approved the shipment, which will arrive under police escort at American Waste Industries on East Indian River Road by the end of the week. 

The transport route and the exact date and time of the shipment's arrival is being kept confidential for security reasons, state officials said. 

As with two prior shipments in January and October, this one -- from Department of Justice offices in Landover, Md., -- has been decontaminated with a chlorine solution and wrapped in two layers of plastic. 

The waste will be burned at temperatures between 1,400 and 1,800 degrees. 

Anthrax spores are not thought to survive temperatures above 300 degrees, experts have said. 

Incinerating hazardous waste from anthrax cleanups poses little risk to surrounding residents, health experts have said. A study two years ago by a national health panel found little evidence that medical-waste incinerators like the one in Norfolk affect the health of people who live nearby. 

Law sends laboratories into pathogen panic

by ERIKA CHECK 

[WASHINGTON] When unknown parties mailed anthrax spores to several US addresses in the autumn of 2001, plant researchers at a herbarium at Harvard University began to get nervous.

For years, the researchers had stored a set of innocuous-looking brown envelopes that contained samples of anthrax. Within weeks of the attacks, President George W. Bush had signed a law called the USA Patriot Act, under which possession of anthrax without a "bona fide research justification" became a criminal offence. The Harvard researchers soon found themselves facing a tricky dilemma — how to balance their hoarding instincts against the new demands of homeland security.

As thousands of US biologists face up to the same problem, some scientific leaders are concerned that researchers are dumping valuable samples to avoid trouble with the law.

For example, Ron Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, is alarmed by the prosecution last July of a University of Connecticut graduate student who kept anthrax in his freezer. Atlas says these old microbes could hold useful information. "We are really in a delicate balance as to whether individuals will hold on to their cultures or whether they'll feel endangered by the USA Patriot Act," he says. He also warns that those who clear out their freezers may have problems restocking them because of new restrictions on the movement of pathogens between labs.

Some institutions — such as Iowa State University at Ames, which destroyed its entire archive of anthrax samples in October 2001 — have ordered mass clear-outs of materials. But individual researchers have also taken it upon themselves to dump potentially dangerous microbes.  John Collier, a Harvard microbiologist who has long worked on the anthrax toxin, got rid of his samples of the bacteria late in 2001. "I wanted to be able to tell the world we didn't have Bacillus anthracis," Collier says.

The issue has now attracted the White House's attention — in part because archived samples could prove useful in criminal investigations.  Kathryn Harrington, a spokeswoman for the administration's Office of Science and Technology Policy, says that the office is "aware of the destruction of select agents and is concerned". She adds that the office is trying to "encourage researchers to transfer materials to a secure facility, rather than destroy them".

This is exactly what the Harvard plant scientists did, after consulting their colleague molecular biologist Matthew Meselson. He contacted Paul Keim, a microbiologist at Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff who has spent his career studying anthrax. Keim persuaded the Harvard
scientists to send him their envelopes, which are thought to contain anthrax taken from the blood of a cow in 1883. "We were interested in these for basic pathogen-evolution studies," Keim says. "But now they're crucial for fighting bioterrorism."

Keim also argues that the federal government should use some of its new bioterrorism funds to solve the problem once and for all by creating a central repository for pathogens. "There's a big problem with saving these collections and a big problem with getting access to them," Keim says. "What's the point of putting $1.7 billion into the research if nobody can get hold of the strains?"

Kevin Johnson and Steve Sternberg 
17 January 2003 
USA Today FINAL A.03 

WASHINGTON -- A nationally recognized scientist has acknowledged that he "accidentally destroyed" 30 vials of plague bacteria and then lied to Texas Tech University officials and the FBI when he reported the vials missing, according to federal court documents released Thursday.

One federal law enforcement source said Thomas Butler, chief of the infectious diseases division at Texas Tech, admitted making the false statements in a handwritten declaration after a polygraph test raised questions about the veracity of his original story.

Butler, 62, was arrested late Wednesday and is being held in the Lubbock County Jail. In his statement, which is included in court papers, he said he never thought his false report would trigger an alert at the White House and a frantic search involving more than 60 investigators, some of whom feared a case of bioterrorism.

"I made a misjudgment," Butler reportedly told the FBI. "Because I knew that the pathogen was destroyed and there was no threat to the public, I provided an inaccurate explanation  . . .  and did not realize it would require such an extensive investigation."

Federal agents say Butler might have been trying to protect himself from possible university and federal sanctions after not properly documenting the bacteria's destruction in lab records. "As a result of this false statement," U.S. prosecutors said in court documents, "the FBI was misled and necessarily expended tremendous investigative resources."

Butler's scheduled appearance in a Lubbock federal court Thursday was postponed until Tuesday at prosecutors' request. If convicted of giving a false statement to a federal agent, he could be sentenced to five years in prison and fined $250,000. His lawyer could not be reached for comment.

Officials at the university in the Texas Panhandle have placed Butler on paid leave from his $130,467-a-year post. Texas Tech officials have ordered him not to return to campus, changed locks on laboratories and eliminated Butler's access to university computers.

Butler's arrest was a jolt to the Lubbock campus, which drew national attention Wednesday amid concern about a possible public health threat. Plague, and other deadly agents such as smallpox and anthrax, are on a government watch list designed to make sure that hospitals and doctors recognize signs of a biological attack.

"He's a very, very well-respected individual," university spokeswoman Cindy Rugely said of Butler. "This is just stunning."

Butler got his medical degree at Vanderbilt University and completed graduate training at Johns Hopkins University Medical Center in Baltimore. He states in his resume that, as a naval officer during the Vietnam War, he ran a U.S. Naval Research Unit in Danang and spent two years studying plague in Vietnam for the U.S. Army. Butler has done numerous studies on tropical and infectious diseases, many of them sponsored by major drug firms. He has received a