The Anthrax
Letters
Five
Deaths, Five Grams, Five Clues
By Paul de Armond
Albion Monitor August 16 2002
(http://albionmonitor.net)
A close look at
the anthrax attacks reveals the deadly bacteria could only have been produced
by a covert bioweapons program in violation of international law.
Is that the reason why the FBI hasn't been able to catch the killer?
Somewhere out there in America
is a would-be mass killer. Someone who has killed five people already,
injured many more and set off a nationwide panic -- and who may well be
poised to strike again.
Remember the anthrax attacks?
Back in October 2001, they regularly led the news as fear of anthrax gripped
the nation. Five people died.
Approximately two dozen victims
developed full-blown infections. Many more were exposed, but were
treated in time to avoid becoming ill. Tens of thousands at risk of exposure
were prescribed antibiotics as a precaution. Many developed qualms about
opening mail.
The FBI launched an investigation
of the attacks, widely believed at first to be more terrorism by Al Qaeda.
But as the preponderance of evidence gradually grew to show that the attacks
have domestic roots -- the attacker is profiled by the FBI as a "lone wolf"
type with a personal agenda -- rather than international terrorism linked
to al Qaida or Iraq, the news receded from the front. The evasive silence
by baffled law-enforcement officials on the case caused the story's retreat
to the neverland of media coverage.
Now as the anniversary of the
attacks approaches, the investigation remains an embarrassing failure.
The problems with the investigation lie with the circumstances that made
the attack possible, not with the cleverness of the attacker.
One of the many puzzles in the
case is why the FBI pursued a case theory of international terrorism for
three months -- until the trail went stone cold -- and then, when the domestic
roots of the attack became glaringly public, suddenly switched to a theory
the attacks were the work of a "lone wolf" working in isolation. The puzzle
is what led the FBI to conclude that only one person was involved -- and
at the same time have no clue as to who that single isolated individual
could possibly be.
The killer or killers, however,
remain at large. Indeed, as the trail grows colder daily, the likelihood
anyone will ever be brought to trial becomes more faint ... unless the
attacks resume.
The attacker's elusiveness so
far is a direct product of the incredibly dangerous nature of the anthrax
itself. Among the few things we know about the killer is that he is well
trained in microbiology and handling biowarfare agents. Along with the
letters to various public figures in which the anthrax was delivered, he
left behind virtually none of the usual clues -- hairs, fibers, smudgeprints
-- that help forensic scientists narrow the investigation in most such
cases. The care required to avoid exposure to such a powerful toxin --
one that has killed two victims in New York and Connecticut by routes that
remain obscure -- make it virtually certain the attacker never had physical
contact with the letters after they were filled with anthrax.
However, there is the anthrax
itself. Importantly enough, just the fact of its use provides important
evidence about the killer. And from the sample used by this killer, there
are five clues that emerge clearly -- clues that eventually may reveal
his identity:
* We know the culprit used a particular
strain obtained from USAMRIID at Fort Detrick
* We know the letters contained
about seven to ten grams of material, of which roughly two to three grams
were weaponized spores
* We know the spore powder was
remarkably pure in the later attacks, less so in the earlier ones
* We know the range of particle
sizes and the method used to make the dry powder
* Finally, the spore powder contained
chemical additives developed specifically for weaponization
Very little information about
the anthrax has been made public by federal authorities, despite repeated
pledges of disclosure by the White House, the Office of Homeland Security
and the FBI. Much of the information appearing in the press is attributed
to unnamed sources or "officials speaking on condition of anonymity" and
very little hard information can be traced to on-record sources.
Unfounded speculation, conflicting reports and uncorrected misinformation
are common. Erroneous reports of links between the anthrax case and the
Sept. 11 attacks continue to be publicized, though none of these supposed
connections have panned out.
Was the anthrax produced domestically,
as part of an undisclosed biological weapons program? If so, how did it
come to be used to commit a series of murders that threw the country into
an uproar? Was the attacker acting as an agent of a foreign government?
Or was the crime an extortion plot that got out of hand? Was the motive
political? Or was it intended to inspire a spate of funding for research
into bioweapons? An attempt to erode American inhibitions on the first
use of nuclear weapons? Or even an attempt by criminals to establish
credentials in the international black market in weapons? And finally,
might the attacker simply be insane and his motives purely idiosyncratic?
None of these questions can be
answered until those responsible are brought to justice. The publicly available
evidence, such as it is, casts little light on whatever motive impelled
the crimes.
It is widely acknowledged that
there is a link between the murderer and biological weapons research. But
we don't know who mailed the anthrax. We don't know who made the anthrax.
We don't know who stole the anthrax from USAMRIID -- or how. We don't know
if those are the same people or different. And if they are different,
we don't know what the connection between them might be. We don't even
know if there might be more than one person involved. There is a lot we
don't know.
But thanks to the anthrax, there
are a few things we do know.
The problem, however, is where
these clues inevitably lead. Tracing the anthrax, it has become clear that
in order for the case to be solved, the FBI must take the lid off the nation's
bioweapons-development program. And with a bevy of national-security issues
at stake -- not to mention a host of political realities -- that makes
the solution of the anthrax case by federal agents a critical test of the
reorganization of the FBI.
Six other countries
also have the Ames strain
The first clue is the use of the
Ames strain of anthrax. Ames is one of the more virulent strains
and is used in research to "challenge" vaccines. Anthrax is one of the
least genetically diverse bacteria known. As of the beginning of this year,
there were less than two hundred genetically identified strains, a fraction
of the diversity found in other bacteria.
Highly sensitive DNA tests using
both genomic sequencing and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing shows
that the attacker's anthrax is identical to a strain used in biological
weapons research. The DNA test results were complete sometime in February,
but the results were kept from the public until mid-May.
Only a handful of laboratories
do anthrax research, but until 1997, the exchange of samples between researchers
was both common and informal. After the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress
passed a law requiring all transfers of biological agents to be registered
with the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. The transfer
documents are open records under the Freedom of Information Act. FOIA requests
unearthed by the Washington Post show that USAMRIID distributed samples
of the Ames strain to about a dozen researchers.
To date, about fifteen locations
in the United States and another half-dozen in other countries are identified
as receiving the Ames strain from USAMRIID. Some of them appear to have
shared samples with others still unknown. In addition to this distribution,
there could be specimens of anthrax in many places, none of which are labeled
"Ames," but which are the same strain. Nobody really knows. So the use
of the Ames strain is weak evidence for prosecution, but it shows a direct
link between the attacker and research connected to USAMRIID. The real
question is how direct is the connection.
The second clue is the quantity
of the anthrax used in the attacks, which was also noteworthy largely because
of the nature of the sample.
The total amount of material used
in the letter attacks was about seven to ten grams. Earlier reports lean
to the higher numbers and the later reports cite smaller amounts. Of this,
most was comprised of harmless, dead vegetative cells and other non-infectious
debris, but roughly two to three grams were pure spores -- a fact that
stops researchers in their tracks. Growing anthrax bacteria is one thing,
but turning living vegetative cells into dormant spores is something else.
Producing quantities of vegetative
cells is difficult, but not incredibly so. The problem lies in getting
the vegetative cells to turn into spores without killing them. Making purified
spores in quantity is a difficult and complex task -- not just hard to
do, but hard to discover how. An amateur could conceivably grow live anthrax
bacteria. But it is unlikely someone could independently rediscover how
to purify and dry spore powder without drawing on knowledge and techniques
gained from experience in weapons research.
Weapons production works in enormous
quantities of anthrax. Under these conditions, producing pure spores is
relatively easy. The attacker's anthrax was roughly 75 percent non-infectious
material. This was probably due to the attacker working with a relatively
small quantity in weapons terms. In medical research, the quantity produced
by the attacker is considered enormous.
Growing purified spores in larger
than microscopic quantities is strongly associated with bioweapons research
and development. Spores are only of interest for examining inhalatory infection,
a subject of mostly military concern. Even then, only tiny quantities are
necessary. A lethal dose of inhaled spores is about 1/100,000th of a gram.
Anthrax research for non-military purposes rarely if ever uses spores.
Producing quantities of spores is the object of weapons-related research.
Thus the quantity of spores is
a second, and even more substantive, link between the attacker and weapons
research. The overwhelming odds are that if the attacker produced the anthrax,
he found out how to do it from contact with military research.
It also suggests that similar
weaponized anthrax powder may have existed at some as-yet undisclosed laboratories.
Whose laboratory and where it is located will be critical information in
a criminal trial.
One Batch or Two?
Particle Size in the Anthrax Mailings
The third clue from the spores
is ambiguous -- namely, the anthrax used by the attacker varied in purity.
It seems likely there were two batches of letters; three letters mailed
in mid-September to New York and Florida, followed by two letters mailed
in early October to Washington, D.C. The anthrax for the New York mailings
was not very high in purity; those batches contained about 10 percent anthrax
spores. The powder in the Daschle and Leahy letters is remarkably pure,
consisting almost entirely of viable spores.
The composition of the Florida
anthrax is critical to the case. It appears to have been intermediate in
purity between the New York and Washington, DC samples. It was more concentrated
than the New York anthrax and contained a sufficient amount of aerosolized
spores to cause three inhalatory exposures (one fatal and one nearly so),
numerous trace instances of contamination in post offices, and a distinct
pattern of airborne and non-airborne contamination in the American Media,
Inc. offices. The epidemiological evidence shows that it was mailed at
the same time as the New York letters. The great significance of these
facts has been consistently overlooked.
Maj. Gen. John Parker, commander
of the division that includes USAMRIID, says the New York samples were
considerably less pure than the Daschle sample. "Times ten difference,"
according to Gen. Parker. According to the testimony of Dr. Kenneth Alibek,
the former head of the Soviet Union's bioweapons research program, before
the House International Relations Committee, the impurities included dead
vegetative anthrax cells.
The Daschle and Leahy samples
were reportedly nearly-pure spores. However, the anthrax used in U.S. and
Soviet weapons was not this pure. The impurities in the military anthrax
were mostly due to the milling process used to reduce the size of the particles
to the tiny size necessary to enter people's lungs. This milling debris
would dilute the anthrax with killed or damaged spores. Its absence in
the Senate samples is highly suggestive of a spray-drying process -- a
recent innovation in anthrax-weapons research.
The high purity of the anthrax
is an indication the attacker knew critical details of weaponization technology
and was familiar with the process. It's unlikely anyone would be able to
produce such a pure result on the first try. That suggests the quantity
used in the attacks was only one of several batches, some of which may
have been failures. What happened to the earlier trial batches? Why does
it appear the attacker had such a small amount, compared to the quantity
necessary to perfect the process?
Most importantly, how do the five
samples of anthrax in each of the letters compare to each other?
Are they different portions of a single batch or do they differ in their
essential chemical and physical characteristics?
Clearly NOT the
kind of anthrax used by the military
The fourth clue is the size of
the anthrax particles. The earlier mailings used coarser powder than the
later ones. There is conflicting information about the size of the particles.
All of the envelopes were tightly taped to seal the seams and openings.
It appears the anthrax that escaped in the mail leaked through the paper,
not through openings or seams. To pass through the microscopic pores in
the envelopes' paper, the particles would have to be smaller than 50 microns.
To get into the lungs, anthrax particles have to be smaller than 10 microns
(a single spore is about 1 micron). The tightly taped envelopes worked
as filters, passing only the deadliest size of particles.
The only inhalatory infections
were related to the letter sent to Florida and the two letters sent to
Washington, D.C. Tiny amounts of fine powder leaked out of the Florida
letter in the mail, enough to be detected in several post offices, but
not enough to make people sick. The pattern of contamination in the American
Media, Inc. offices suggests a mixture of coarse and fine particles. Three
people at the AMI offices were exposed to airborne particles. One died,
one became very ill and one received antibiotics before an infection developed.
The two who became ill are believed to have handled or opened the letter.
Neither of the two letters sent
to New York can be tied to any inhalatory infections, but they did cause
several cutaneous infections. Those letters contained coarse granules --
according to one eyewitness, the New York anthrax was like sand, not fine
powders.
The known dates of initial infectious
symptoms occur first in New York and are followed by the deaths in Florida.
The New York infections (not including Kathy Nguyen's anomalous death in
late October, which appears to be linked to the Washington DC anthrax letters)
were cutaneous -- not inhalatory -- and there is no evidence of airborne
transmission with the anthrax in the New York letters. The onset of infections
in Florida followed several days after the initial symptoms appeared in
New York. The difference between the Florida and New York anthrax samples
will have to be explained during any prosecution of the attacker.
Given what is known about how
anthrax can be weaponized, the most likely (but not the only) explanation
is that the anthrax used in the attacks was dried and weaponized as a single
batch and the separation into different particle sizes and purities occurred
after the spores were dried. This conclusion, if supported by additional
evidence, has the corollary that the envelopes were filled in the following
order: New York, Florida, Washington, D.C..
Some reports -- which appear to
be leaks from a FBI/CIA briefing given to senators on the morning of October
25 -- say the particle size of the Washington D.C. anthrax was between
1 and 5 microns or between 1.5 and 3.5 microns. The same anonymous reports
claim that the anthrax was "milled" -- ground into a fine powder. The narrow
range of particle sizes and use of milling are typical of the older processes
used by the U.S. and Soviets during their offensive weapons programs. It
is now clear the anthrax used in the attacks is distinctly different from
the anthrax made and stockpiled for military use.
None of the reports of milled
powder with a narrow particle size range have identified sources speaking
from direct knowledge. Nor do these reports discuss the varying purity
and particle size between the early and late letters. Yet these unsubstantiated
hearsay reports have been continuously repeated in describing the powder.
It now appears these leaks from the Senate briefing were wrong in several
details: the quoted range of particle size is too small and the anthrax
used in the attacks was not milled. The misinformation about the particle
size and milling continues to be repeated in news reports.
A weapons research
program is the most likely source
Three Office of Homeland Security
press conferences given by Tom Ridge and others between October 25 and
October 29, beginning immediately after the closed Senate briefings, contained
little specific information. This is the only official source of information
on the characteristics of the anthrax powder, and the specific size range
of the particles was not disclosed. Overall, the information given out
at the Homeland Security press conference was vague, muddled and created
more speculation than answers. It did not settle the questions about the
size of the anthrax particles or the process for producing the powder.
It did, however, confirm the presence of weaponization additives. And unlike
all but one other instance, the White House press conferences featured
identified sources speaking on the record.
Dr. Kenneth Alibek -- a Russian
scientist who worked at the very top of the Soviet anthrax program and
defected to the United States in the early 1990s -- is a third source of
information about the anthrax powder. On December 5, Dr. Alibek and two
other experts testified before the House International Relations Committee
about the anthrax attacks. Of the three, only Alibek claimed to have direct
knowledge of the investigation. He said he had been shown "pictures" of
anthrax from two of the letters.
Alibek identified what he called
the "first sample" as being largely contaminated with vegetative cells;
these would be dead anthrax bacteria that didn't turn into spores. This
"first sample" was probably the New York Post anthrax, though Alibek did
not make that clear. The second set of pictures were of the Daschle anthrax.
An anthrax spore is about one micron in diameter. Alibek said the Daschle
sample had particles ranging from one to fifty microns in size. This size
range is typical of powders produced by spray-drying, but not of milled
anthrax.
Alibek unequivocally said that
the particles showed no signs of milling. Alibek's testimony about the
particle size has not appeared in any news reports, though some stories
have described other parts of the hearing. To date, though, Alibek has
declined interview requests to discuss what he calls "detective questions"
about the anthrax.
Following the completion of the
tests on the Leahy sample, unidentified sources were cited repeating the
details about the range of particle sizes, the lack of milling debris and
the presence of chemical additives. The newer information about the Leahy
anthrax further reduced the likelihood of the older military process (which
is what was described in the Senate leaks) being used by the attacker.
Most significant among the Leahy results was the report of individual coated
spores being observed in the sample -- something that had never been observed
with the older military process.
The two different descriptions
of the anthrax powder correspond to the two ways of weaponizing anthrax
into a dry powder. At least one of the descriptions is wrong. The anthrax
used in the attacks is either one description or the other or neither --
but not both. The leaks from the Senate briefing describe the drying and
milling process used by the U.S. and the Soviets. Alibek appears to be
describing a spray-drying process similar to one the Iraqis were experimenting
with a decade ago.
The United States is known to
be intensely interested in this newer technology for weaponizing anthrax.
Both the milling and spray-drying
processes have been reproduced by the United States in several recent "defensive"
research programs. The CIA has done extensive research on biological munitions
and production processes. Two of these efforts have been identified as
Project Jefferson (actually a broad program involving many separate projects)
and Clear Vision, the reproduction of a Soviet anthrax bomb. The Defense
Threat Reduction Agency has built a pilot plant in Nevada capable of producing
anthrax as part of Project BACHUS (Biological Activities CHaracterized
by Unconventional Signatures.) Reportedly, this project acquired milling
equipment, though DTRA has denied it was used for weaponization. The publicly-
acknowledged work at BACHUS used Bacillus globuli, a less-dangerous "simulant"
of anthrax. And the U.S. Army has been producing small quantities of weaponized
anthrax for several years at the Dugway Proving Grounds. Prior to the disclosure
of these activities, the U.S. government has routinely denied such research
has been taking place.
Use of the Ames strain, quantity,
purity and particle size: These four points are strongly suggestive of
weapons research being the source of the anthrax used in the attacks, but
none of them are conclusive in and of themselves. Together, they paint
a very strong circumstantial picture.
It is unlikely that a loner, even
with a strong background in microbiology, could produce five grams of purified
anthrax spores with fine particle sizes. It's possible, but it would be
very difficult and time-consuming to independently reproduce the results
of years of research from highly specialized military programs. If the
attacker had access to secret technical information about weaponizing anthrax,
the difficulties become less of a barrier. If he had experience with the
process, they practically disappear.
The use of the Ames strain, the
quantity, the purity and the particle size suggest the attacker had access
to secret bio-weapons research. But there is nothing about these facts
that points unequivocally to a source for the anthrax.
The telltale link
to the world of bioweapons
The fifth clue implicating weapons
research is the most damning -- namely, the presence of chemical additives.
Without going into the details, this is the one part of the weaponization
process that lacks other uses or applications and is unique to producing
biological weapons. These additives are necessary to produce small particles
from the spore slurry. They were detected in the anthrax used in the attacks
by energy dispersive spectroscopy (EDS), a very sensitive test for chemical
composition. These additives were discussed in the leaks from the Senate
briefing, as well as at two Homeland Security press conferences. They also
are mentioned in the still-secret FBI report on the Leahy sample.
In mid-April, some facts from
the analysis of the Leahy anthrax sample were leaked to CNN, U.S. News
and World Report and Newsweek magazines. All three reports are based on
anonymous sources. They disagree as to whether the weaponization additives
are previously known or unknown to U.S. researchers, but they all agree
that the additives are present.
Chemical additives are a crucial
part of the weaponization process. The specific chemicals are a tightly
held secret (which should not be disclosed to the public). But the particular
combination of ingredients would be strong evidence if the attacker used
a formula similar to one developed in recent U.S. bioweapons research.
The EDS testing is sensitive enough to identify the elements present in
the anthrax powder. In some circumstances, it can also identify the chemical
compounds themselves. So again, the critical information is not a mystery
to the investigators, though it is not being made public.
The bioweapon world's
secretive environment protects the killer
These five clues sum up what is
publicly known about the anthrax used in the attacks. Together, they
strongly suggest the attacker had access to either the technical information
or the product from biological weapons research. The Ames strain from USAMRIID,
amount of spores, purity, particle size and chemical coatings point to
a well-funded and sizable research program with government support. The
investigators know the composition of the additives, a highly restricted
and specialized area of research. They also know whether the powder was
milled or spray-dried, which means they know the type equipment which must
have been used to make the anthrax.
All of the questions posed in
this article have answers. Many of the answers have been known to the investigators
since late October, less than a month after the attacks became known. They
have not been publicly disclosed nor has there been any explanation for
this secrecy. The FBI investigation has been an embarrassing failure and
it has taken many wrong turns. Some of the general information about the
anthrax powder should be made public. There are details which can be revealed
that could aid the investigation without revealing technical secrets --
and this kind of information may very well jog the memory of witnesses
who can provide valuable leads.
The secrecy surrounding the anthrax
is central to the mystery of how this investigation has gone so wrong.
Some facts are clear about the case. The weaponization process used by
the attacker is newer and more sophisticated than allowed under the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention, which specifically forbids developing new
weapons. The attacks have shown how small quantities of a biological weapon
are sufficient to be used as a strategic offensive weapon. The problem
with the investigation may not be the attacker's attempts at concealment,
but what the existence of the anthrax itself implies.
And that is that somewhere --
in an environment insecure enough to allow diversion to criminal use --
secret, illegal and unauthorized research has developed new and dangerous
ways to proliferate biological weapons. If that secrecy can also shield
a murderer and a traitor, then murder is not the only crime the FBI should
be investigating.
Paul de Armond is
research director at the Public Good Project, a privately-funded research
network. In 1995, de Armond was the first source to identify the Oklahoma
City bombing as domestic right-wing terrorism. He has written about crime
and political conflicts which threaten democracy. His most recent works
include an analysis of the WTO protests in Networks and Netwar: the future
of crime, terrorism and militancy (a much longer version first appeared
in Albion Monitor) and a discussion of right-wing domestic terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction: Hype or Reality? The 'New Terrorism' and Mass
Casualty Attacks (Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000). |