FEAR INC.
— A TIMES INVESTIGATION
Selling
the threat of bioterrorism
An ex-Soviet scientist
raised fears, helped shape U.S. policy and sought to profit.
By David Willman, Times Staff
Writer
July 1, 2007
WASHINGTON — In the fall
of 1992, Kanatjan Alibekov defected from Russia to the United States, bringing
detailed, and chilling, descriptions of his role in making biological weapons
for the former Soviet Union.
As a doctor of microbiology, a
physician and a colonel in the Red Army, he helped lead the Soviet effort.
He told U.S. intelligence agencies that the Soviets had devoted at least
30,000 scientists, working at dozens of sites, to develop bioweapons, despite
a 1972 international ban on such work.
He said that emigrating Russian
scientists and others posed imminent threats. After the breakup of the
Soviet Union, he said, several specialists went to Iraq and North Korea.
Both countries, he said, may have obtained anthrax and smallpox. The transfer
of smallpox would be especially ominous because the Russians, he said,
had sought to genetically modify the virus, posing lethal risk even to
those who had been vaccinated.
His expertise, combined with his
dire pronouncements, solidified his cachet in Washington. He simplified
his name to Ken Alibek, became a familiar figure on Capitol Hill, and emerged
as one of the most important voices in U.S. decisions to spend billions
of dollars to counter anthrax, smallpox and other potential bioterrorism
agents.
"It was Alibek's revelations,
when he defected, that really provided the first information about the
scope" of both the Soviet program and the possible proliferation to Iran
and Iraq, said Dr. Thomas Monath, who was a top biodefense specialist for
the U.S. Army.
Monath, who later led a group
of experts that advised the Central Intelligence Agency on ways to counter
biological attacks, said Alibek's information resonated at high levels
of the U.S. government and was "amplified by 9/11."
"I think he influenced many people
who were in position to make some decisions about response," Monath said,
adding, "Concern about smallpox, in particular, was driven by Alibek."
Dr. Kenneth W. Bernard, who served
President Bush as a special assistant for biodefense, agreed, saying that
Alibek "had a substantial and profound effect."
Having raised the prospect that
Iraq had acquired the ability to wield smallpox or anthrax, Alibek also
was outspoken as the U.S. went to war in early 2003, saying there was "no
doubt" that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.
Officials still value his seminal
depictions of the Soviet program. But recent events have propelled questions
about Alibek's reliability:
No biological weapon of mass destruction
has been found in Iraq. His most sensational research findings, with U.S.
colleagues, have not withstood peer review by scientific specialists. His
promotion of nonprescription pills — sold in his name over the Internet
and claiming to bolster the immune system — was ridiculed by some scientists.
He resigned as executive director of a Virginia university's biodefense
center 10 months ago while facing internal strife over his stewardship.
And, as Alibek raised fear of
bioterrorism in the United States, he also has sought to profit from that
fear.
By his count, Alibek has won about
$28 million in federal grants or contracts for himself or entities that
hired him.
He has had well-placed help. Some
of the money has been allocated because of a Southern California congressman's
"earmarks," controversial budget maneuvers that direct federal agencies'
spending. Moreover, two senior aides to a New Jersey congressman
who also provided crucial help to Alibek left government and promptly joined
his commercial efforts.
Alibek now is seeking new government
contracts related to countering biological terrorism that could be worth
tens of millions of dollars.
He has followed an unconventional
scientific approach, seeking a product that would protect against an array
of deadly viruses and bacteria, not just a single germ.
He also is raising money to build
a drug-manufacturing plant in the former Soviet republic of Ukraine.
From there, his company will seek to sell its antiviral agents and antibiotics
to the U.S. government's Strategic National Stockpile, he said.
Thickly built and with willing,
if imperfect, English, Alibek said in an interview that his focus had been
scientific, "in terms of raising awareness about biological weapons and
biological terrorism." An attack, he said, could kill "hundreds of millions,
if not billions" of people.
The Los Angeles Times explored
Alibek's public pronouncements, research and business activities as part
of a series that will examine companies and government officials central
to the U.S. war on terrorism.
Uncertainty surrounds the threat
of a biological attack. Authorities list no fewer than 30 fungi, bacteria
and viruses as potential biological weapons. One agent, anthrax, already
has been deployed in the U.S., killing five people in late 2001. Because
anthrax spores can be dispersed in a variety of ways — perhaps even by
bomb — some experts believe that a well-executed attack could kill millions
of people over large areas. Others, citing the vagaries of weather, say
that anthrax or other airborne agents are unlikely mass killers.
Some experts question Alibek's
characterizations of the threats.
Dr. Philip K. Russell, a retired
Army major general and physician who joined the Bush administration from
2001 to 2004 to confront the perceived threat of smallpox, said he was
convinced that Alibek had solid firsthand information about the former
Soviet Union's production of anthrax. But regarding other threats, such
as genetically engineered smallpox, Russell said he "began to think that
Ken was more fanciful than precise in some of his recollections."
"He would claim that certain things
had been done, and then when you came right down to it, he didn't have
direct knowledge of it — he'd heard it from somebody. For example, the
issue of putting Ebola genes into smallpox virus. That was viewed, at least
in many of our minds, as somewhat fanciful. And probably not true."
Alibek told The Times that the
comments in question were based on articles he read in Russia's "scientific
literature."
Big transition
Alibek, 56, is now a player in
the multibillion-dollar business that has sprouted around the U.S. war
on terrorism.
It's been a stark transformation
for the former Communist military man.
Alibek grew up in Almaty, the
capital of the then-Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. After entering the
Tomsk Medical Institute in Siberia, he studied the 1942-43 battle of Stalingrad.
As he described in a 1999 memoir,
"Biohazard," Alibek concluded that the Soviets had waged biological warfare
against the Germans and that "large numbers" of the invaders fell ill with
tularemia, a deadly infectious disease also known as rabbit fever.
But Alibek also described a lesson
he learned about the risk of waging germ warfare: Because of a wind shift,
the Soviets had inadvertently infected their own troops and civilians,
causing perhaps thousands of casualties.
When Alibek emerged with a medical
degree, he was recruited by the Soviet government and climbed in military
rank while earning a doctorate in microbiology. In 1987, he was promoted
to a top position in Biopreparat, the civilian agency that ran the Soviets'
secret biological-weapons program.
Alibek has said he worked with
numerous lethal agents — including Marburg virus, plague, smallpox and
a virulent "battle strain" of anthrax. The Soviets assumed that the U.S.,
which began developing germ weapons during World War II, maintained its
program despite the 1972 international ban.
By the late 1980s, with the Cold
War ending, teams of U.S. and Soviet biological warfare experts prepared
to visit each other's laboratories to see for themselves.
On Dec. 11, 1991, Alibek and his
Soviet colleagues traveled to Ft. Detrick, Md., home to the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), where researchers
studied how to protect troops from germ warfare, work that was allowed
under the 1972 agreement. And Alibek began making personal connections
that would soon ease his transition to American life.
None would prove more important
to him than his rapport with USAMRIID director Charles L. Bailey, an entomologist
and U.S. Army colonel.
Within a year, Alibek resigned
from Biopreparat and fled to the U.S. with his wife and three children.
Bailey retired from the Army but stayed at Ft. Detrick as an analyst with
the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.
Bailey's job was to assess what
the Russians were up to.
This gave him a close view of
Alibek's confidential debriefings with U.S. intelligence agents. The debriefings,
Bailey said, provided "very valuable" information about the Russian program.
Alibek described threats beyond the Russian borders.
"Alibek thought that every country
that had anthrax" also had smallpox, including Iraq, Iran and North Korea,
Bailey said.
In the mid-1990s, when Bailey
went to work for a Huntsville, Ala., company with defense and intelligence
contracts, Alibek visited frequently. They shared meals, attended horse
shows. Alibek seemed to enjoy learning about American life.
"He was easy to like," Bailey
recalled. "We became friends."
They also became a commercially
sought-after team.
"I helped to build Alibek's reputation
with the military," Bailey said. "A lot of people were impressed with Alibek.
I was impressed."
The Alabama company also hired
Alibek as a consultant, and asked him to compose a history of the Soviet
program that could be used by the intelligence community.
In 1997, the two worked together
for Battelle, a large nonprofit research and development organization.
Next, they moved to Virginia-based Hadron Inc., another firm that had ties
to U.S. intelligence agencies. Alibek also circulated among government
officials. He privately briefed Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, then vice chairman
of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, the nation's second-highest military officer.
Alibek made his first network-television
news appearance in February 1998, and three months later testified at a
congressional committee hearing on terrorism and intelligence. A news release
said Alibek would "provide new information on Russia's offensive biological
weapons program."
The only contact listed was a
committee staffer named Vaughn Forrest, a onetime candidate for Congress.
Forrest in the 1980s had traveled to Afghanistan to support the Muslims
who ultimately drove out the invading Soviet Union. In helping Afghanistan's
mujahedin, Forrest had developed a productive relationship with the CIA.
Forrest introduced Alibek to the chairman of the Senate-House Joint Economic
Committee. Forrest took the lead in arranging the hearing.
He and Alibek formed a lasting
bond.
In his 1999 memoir, Alibek said
that Forrest "was among the first to perceive the potential" for developing
a product that would guard against not one, but an array of biological
agents.
Forrest introduced Alibek to others
who could help, including Florida Republican Bill McCollum, then-chairman
of the House Intelligence Committee. Forrest had once been McCollum's chief
of staff. McCollum, now Florida attorney general, said Alibek "was worried
about what the Soviets had made and what somebody else could get ahold
of."
The list of identified suspects,
McCollum said, included Libya, Iran and Iraq.
"I thought we had a real threat
from this," McCollum said, adding that he distributed Alibek's book to
"people in the administration and also members of Congress."
When Forrest left the congressional
payroll, he became a consultant to Hadron Inc., where Alibek and Bailey
worked. Forrest later became a director with Alibek in a successor company.
Forrest declined to be interviewed for this report.
Alibek's public profile rose after
the Sept. 11 attacks and the mailings of anthrax a month later that killed
five people.
Appearing before a House subcommittee
on national security in October 2001, Alibek said that earlier "attempts
to wipe out Iraq's biological weapons capability were probably not successful."
He also told the subcommittee that Russian biological weapons experts had
"emigrated to rogue nations such as Iraq." As the U.S.-led war got underway
in March 2003, Alibek said during an online discussion hosted by the Washington
Post: "There is no doubt in my mind that [Saddam] Hussein has WMD."
Fear that Iraq possessed smallpox
was emphasized by the Bush administration leading up to the war. As Congress
prepared to vote on whether to authorize war, then-Defense Secretary Donald
H. Rumsfeld told the House Armed Services Committee on Sept. 18, 2002,
that a smallpox attack by Iraq could kill as many as 1 million Americans
and infect an additional 2 million.
Alibek has not retreated from
his statements regarding Iraq's possession of smallpox or other biological
weapons. He said in an interview that he had "talked to people who actually
visited the Iraqi sites. And they said they had no doubt [there] was an
offensive biological weapons program…. We need to look for the traces."
It is a lonely position today.
"There's been a lot of people
thrashing around there for the last five years," said Russell, the retired
general. "I don't think anybody could have hid it."
Millions in funding
Alibek's most reliable benefactor
in Washington has been Rep. H. James Saxton (R-N.J.), a gravelly voiced
former elementary school teacher and state legislator. Saxton says that
for two decades, he has focused on the threat posed by Islamic terrorism.
For most of the last decade, Saxton
chaired the House Armed Services Committee's terrorism subcommittee and
also headed the Joint Economic Committee, where Forrest landed as a senior
aide.
On May 21, 2002, Saxton called
a news conference to announce "a potential new defense against bioterrorism,"
based on Alibek's tests with mice. After being treated with an experimental
product, the mice had survived doses of smallpox and anthrax.
Saxton at the time said that the
results held hope for "lifting some of the burden of fear that haunts Americans."
And, while fighting for an earmark
of federal grant money for Alibek at a March 2004 hearing, Saxton upbraided
Anthony Tether, the Bush administration's director of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency.
"You need to be more on his side,"
Saxton said of Alibek, adding: "I find it hard to believe that I have to
fight as hard as I can to get a few measly bucks to keep him going."
Tether assured Saxton that he
would accede to his wishes. Tether did so — and fresh grant money was sent
for Alibek's research.
Tether said that he had resisted
spending more on Alibek's research because his "cocktail approach" — mixing
more than one drug with other ingredients in search of a product that might
protect against smallpox, anthrax and plague — made it "very hard to determine
what is working and what is not."
The research could have dragged
on for years with the ambiguous results, Tether told The Times.
"After the [March 2004] hearing,
I basically said, 'OK, this is it, Alibek. You're either going to get over
here and listen … or you're not going to get a nickel from us,' " Tether
said.
He preserved the funding, Tether
said, after Alibek agreed privately to change his approach and perform
experiments outlined by Tether's staff. Some of Alibek's subsequent work
with mice has shown promise, Tether said.
Alibek also has been helped by
Mark A. O'Connell, a lobbyist and Republican fundraiser who for a decade
served as Saxton's congressional chief of staff. (Campaign contributions
in recent years to Saxton from Alibek, Alibek's wife and one of their business
partners have totaled $14,450, public records show.)
O'Connell said he began lobbying
Congress for Alibek's company in mid-2003, two months after he left Saxton's
staff. His congressional salary, O'Connell said, was slightly below a revolving-door
threshold that would have barred him from lobbying Saxton or his staff
for one year. He confirmed that he had lobbied for the congressional earmarks
benefiting Alibek's company.
Saxton acknowledged in an interview
that he had done much for Alibek since Forrest brought them together about
a decade ago:
He said he introduced Alibek to
then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and to other congressional and
executive-branch leaders. Among them was Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-Redlands),
who from 1999 to 2005 was chairman of the subcommittee that controlled
spending for national security projects. Lewis headed the full House Appropriations
Committee from 2005 to 2006.
Lewis, Saxton said, began providing
the annual earmarks of federal money for Alibek's projects.
"We were able to convince Jerry
Lewis to begin an appropriations stream for him," Saxton said.
Lewis' spokesman, Jim Specht,
did not return telephone calls seeking an interview with the congressman.
Earmarks generate controversy because they enable some projects to win
federal funding based more on political influence than competitive merit.
And earmarks can be carried out discreetly, obscuring the identity of the
originator.
This year, Saxton said, he has
guided Alibek as he seeks an additional $10 million in research funds —
from the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Saxton said that he had helped
Alibek solely to bolster national security.
"I was committed to do whatever
I could do to help develop an answer to problems posed by bioterrorism,"
he said.
"And if they had worked for Alibek
or not, I would have been just as committed," he added, referring to Forrest
and O'Connell.
Alibek's federal research money
also has come from the Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, the
National Institutes of Health, the Department of Energy and the State Department,
according to company and government documents.
The company that Alibek formed
and for which Forrest serves as general manager and as a director, AFG
Biosolutions Inc., has said that it is developing "a new generation of
vaccines" and medicines for anthrax, smallpox, plague and tularemia.
Claims in question
Some of the projects Alibek has
helped lead were promoted heavily but faltered.
One sensational claim came in
a Sept. 11, 2003, news release from Virginia's George Mason University,
where Alibek two years earlier arrived on the faculty.
Findings from laboratory research
led by Alibek and another professor, the news release said, suggested that
smallpox vaccination might increase a person's immunity to HIV, the virus
that causes AIDS. The release quoted Alibek saying, "Our outcomes are very
encouraging."
University President Alan Merten
weighed in, saying the research might "produce dramatic, practical benefits
for future generations."
Scientists elsewhere were less
enthused.
They pointed out that George Mason
had announced the results even though the Journal of the American Medical
Assn. had declined to publish them. Alibek and his colleagues also submitted
a paper summarizing the research to another prominent medical journal,
the Lancet.
The paper "was rejected after
peer review," said Dr. Sabine Kleinert, senior executive editor of the
Lancet, in an e-mailed comment.
More than three years later, no
published study has replicated the provocative results touted by Alibek
and his colleagues at George Mason. Neither Alibek nor his principal collaborator,
who had worked at another university, is still pursuing the project.
"This is a theory that, I must
say, does not hold up at all, and it does not make any sense from a biologic
point of view," said Dr. Donald A. Henderson, a former White House science
advisor whose work with the World Health Organization is credited with
eradicating smallpox outbreaks globally. "This idea … was straight off
the wall. I would put no credence in it at all."
Alibek said that it was not his
decision alone to issue the September 2003 news release. He ascribed others'
criticisms to professional jealousies.
Apart from the university or his
company, Alibek has used his ties with the government to promote "Dr. Ken
Alibek's Immune System Support Formula," nonprescription pills sold over
the Internet. Advertisements for the product described Alibek as a biological
and medical expert who had "testified before Congressional committees and
is a frequent consultant to the U.S. government."
Alibek acknowledged that he did
"consulting work" for a dietary supplement company that distributed the
product in his name, but said that he was not paid for subsequent sales.
However, an aide to the chief executive of the company, Vital Basics Inc.,
said that Alibek was paid.
More recently, Alibek's warnings
of bioterrorist threats echoed in the debate surrounding "Project Bioshield,"
signed into law by Bush in July 2004. The program, with an initial budget
of about $5.6 billion, aims to encourage companies to develop vaccines
or other products that could counter a biological or chemical attack.
And, as Alibek has warned Congress
that enemies of the U.S. have sought genetically altered biological agents
to resist antibiotics or vaccines, he has promoted products that would
address those very threats:
In 2004, a San Diego company,
Aethlon Medical Inc., signed Alibek to its advisory board and issued a
report, co-written by Alibek, which said its product for filtering toxins
from blood "could be rapidly deployed even against genetically altered
biowarfare agents."
Alibek's report emphasized the
availability of federal funds, including from Project Bioshield. Aethlon
said that Alibek served without pay on the advisory board but "may be compensated
for future consulting work."
Alibek also hopes to tap into
Project Bioshield with his own company.
He said that he expected to submit
a proposal to sell what could be millions of dollars of medicines to the
government for use in the event of a terrorist attack or other emergency.
As envisioned by Alibek, his drug facility in the Ukraine would produce
generic versions of antiviral agents or antibiotics at a cost "three, four,
five times lower" than if they were made in the U.S.
Meanwhile, within the last year
an internal controversy flared regarding Alibek's leadership of the National
Center for Biodefense and Infectious Diseases, a fledgling graduate program
at George Mason. Alibek resigned as a tenured and distinguished professor
there last Aug. 31.
University spokeswoman Christine
LaPaille confirmed the resignation and said that George Mason was no longer
collaborating with Alibek's company on research backed by any of the recent
federal grants or contracts. LaPaille declined to comment on the circumstances
surrounding Alibek's departure.
Alibek said the college administration
had grown displeased with his company's role in sharing grant-funded research.
The university, he said, requested that he dismantle or leave AFG Biosolutions.
He chose to resign from George Mason.
This spring, Alibek traveled to
the Ukrainian city of Kiev to push his plans for the drug-manufacturing
plant and for a center for cancer and cardiac care. He did so after making
comments, reported by the Russian news agency Interfax, which struck some
officials in Washington as inconsistent with his previous dramatic claims:
Since 1992, Alibek has told U.S.
intelligence agencies, and later general audiences, that Russia had persisted
in developing biological weapons. For instance, in his memoir, "Biohazard,"
subtitled, "The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons
Program in the World — Told From Inside by the Man Who Ran It," Alibek
wrote in 1999:
"I am convinced that a large portion
of the Soviet Union's offensive program remains viable despite [then-President
Boris N.] Yeltsin's ban on research and testing."
And in a September 2000 interview
with an online publication sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Alibek said:
"Russia is still retaining its
biological weapons capability, specifically at the Ministry of Defense.
The Ministry of Defense is maintaining four major research and production
sites, which are still active."
But as reported by Interfax, Alibek
in November 2005 told a different story in his ancestral hometown of Almaty:
As of the early 1990s, Alibek said, the Russians had stopped "all work
to develop biological weapons."
The arc of Alibek's statements
has not been lost on Bailey, the former USAMRIID chief who remains at George
Mason after having been recruited there six years ago by his former friend.
Does the inconsistency cause him to reassess Alibek's earlier statements
regarding global biological threats?
Bailey answered quietly.
"Definitely, it does."
david.willman@latimes.com
Times researcher
Janet Lundblad in Los Angeles contributed to this report.
--
(INFOBOX BELOW)
Selling the threat
After helping to lead the Soviet
Union's germ-weapons program, Dr. Ken Alibek defected to the U.S. and began
warning about the threat of a mass-casualty biological attack. Alibek also
has sought to profit from the fear of such weapons of mass destruction,
landing federal contracts or grants for himself or entities that hired
him totaling about $28 million, including several listed below.
Pronouncements
1992: Alibek begins describing
to the Central Intelligence Agency details of the biological weapons that
he helped research and develop for the then-newly dissolved Soviet Union.
The alleged magnitude of the program stuns U.S. officials.
May 1998: Alibek tells a congressional
committee that the Russians had produced "hundreds of tons of anthrax weapons"
and "tons of smallpox and plague." And by using genetic engineering, Alibek
says, the Russians sought to "develop antibiotic-resistant'' strains of
various viruses. Alibek also raises the possibility that Soviet weapons
scientists sold their expertise to regimes averse to the U.S., such as
Iraq and Iran.
1999: In his memoir, Alibek writes:
"I am convinced that a large portion of the Soviet Union's offensive program
remains viable despite [then-President Boris N.] Yeltsin's ban on research
and testing."
October 2001: Appearing before
a House subcommittee just a month after the Sept. 11 attacks, Alibek says
some Russian biological weapons experts "have emigrated to rogue nations
such as Iraq." He adds that he believes some countries have secret stocks
of smallpox, and that "well-funded terrorist groups are capable of purchasing
the knowledge" needed to execute a biological attack.
March 2003: As the U.S.-led war
in Iraq gets underway, Alibek tells an online forum: "There is no doubt
in my mind that [Saddam] Hussein has WMD."
April 2007: Asked in an interview
to reconcile his earlier statements with the failure to find smallpox or
any other weapon of mass destruction in Iraq, Alibek says: "We need to
look for the traces."
--
Funding
July 2001: A company at which
Alibek is an executive, Advanced Biosystems, wins a $3.59-million contract
from the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
March 2004: A Republican committee
chairman, Rep. H. James Saxton of New Jersey, upbraids the Bush administration's
director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency on Alibek's behalf.
"You need to be more on his side," Saxton says. The official, Anthony Tether,
reassures Saxton, and releases grant money for Alibek's research.
July 2004: Saxton and Rep. Jerry
Lewis (R-Redlands) work to insert earmarks in appropriation bills that
steer millions of dollars to research led by Alibek at George Mason University
and at a Maryland company he co-founded, AFG Biosolutions Inc.
2005-2007: Alibek's company wins
more than $1 million in small-business innovation research grants from
the National Institutes of Health. One of the company's directors is a
former aide to Rep. Saxton, and its Washington lobbyist is Saxton's former
chief of staff. |