|The United States Army
Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) is located within
a U.S. Army military base named
Fort Detrick, which is located at the northwest edge of Frederick, MD,
in turn located 55 miles west of Baltimore, MD.
September of 2001, USAMRIID consisted of two main buildings: Building
1425 (the receiving dock is at 1425 Porter
Street) where Dr. Bruce Ivins worked at that time, and smaller
1412 (at 1412 Sultan Drive).
Dr. Ivins lived at 622 Military Road, which is located near the bottom of the satellite image below. He would typically ride a bicycle to work, going through the gate just across from his home and entering Building 1425 through the rear entrance, which was the entrance all scientists working in the building used. (The entrance to the Post Exchange (PX), which is the store used by soldiers at Fort Detrick, was in the front of the building at 1407 Porter Street.)
Building 1412 in the satellite image above is about three hundred feet from Building 1425. Building 1412 was where all aerosol testing of animals was done. Bruce Ivins briefly had a lab in Building 1412 in the year 2000, but in September of 2001 his only lab was in Building 1425. In the satellite image above, the small image in the upper left corner is a side view of Building 1412. The small image in the lower right is a side view of Building 1425. The rear door used by Bruce Ivins and most other scientists was in the center of the left side of the building as seen in the image above. Below is another image of Building 1425 as viewed from the front.
The floor plan of the rear half of the first floor of Building 1425 is shown below. When Bruce Ivins would enter via the rear entrance, he would have to scan his personal keycard through a keycard reader. This would record "1425 REAR DR IN" on a computerized "in-out log" indicating that he'd entered the building . (There was also a guard on duty to make sure no one entered without a keycard or an authorized escort.) When leaving, Ivins would again swipe his keycard and it would record as "1425 REAR DR OUT" in the logs. Within Building 1425 there were various "containment areas" where work was being done with different types of bacteria and viruses.
The areas within the red box in the floorplan below include the Staff Area where Dr. Ivins had his office, and the Bacteriology Division where he had his BSL-3 lab in Suite 3 and a BSL-2 lab in Suite 5.
Below is a detailed image of what is inside the red box in the image above. (Click on the image below to view a larger version.) This floorplan image shows the locations of the various keycard readers and the keypad that Dr. Ivins had to use to open doors as he went from one place to another in Building 1425, particularly in the Bacteriology Division and Suite B3 within that division.
According to an article in the Frederick News-Post: the various biosafety levels are defined as follows:
BioSafety Level 1 (BSL-1) - An area where ordinary microbes/agents are often found, such as a kitchen table. Level-1 agents don't pose a serious disease risk to healthy adults. Scientists may use gloves and wash their hands after handing materials, and they may decontaminate work surfaces when done working.
BioSafety Level 2 (BSL-2) - An area where there are microbes/bacterial agents which pose a moderate infection risk. Such agents include hepatitis B, HIV and wet anthrax. Workers use laboratory coats and gloves when working with agents, as well as biological safety cabinets when using agents that might splash or become airborne. Workers might require vaccinations, and work may be done in a biosafety cabinet which has negative air pressure, preventing bacteria within the cabinet from escaping to the outside.
BioSafety Level 3 (BSL-3) - An area where there are microbes/agents which could cause serious illness to persons exposed to them, but vaccines or drugs are available to treat the illness. At USAMRIID, BSL-3 agents include Venezuelan equine encephalitis and anthrax in aerosol form. Workers wear scrubs in BSL-3 areas, they must shower when entering and leaving the BSL-3 area, and they might also wear a Tyvek suit over their head and shoulders and breathe filtered air.
BioSafety Level 4 (BSL-4) - An area where there are microbes/agents for which there is no vaccine or known cure. BSL-4 agents worked with at USAMRIID include Ebola and Marburg viruses. Workers in BSL-4 areas use BioSafety cabinets and full body suits. They breathe through an air supply separate from the lab air. Entering or leaving a BSL-4 area requires decontamination by both water and chemicals. Air in the lab is under negative pressure to prevent agents from escaping into an outside environment.
Once Dr. Ivins was inside Building 1425, he would then either go straight ahead past the guard station to the office in Room 19 in the "Staff Area" which he shared with his two assistants, Patricia Fellows and Kristie Friend, or he'd turn left and use his keycard again to enter the Bacteriology Division corridor.
Entering the Bacteriology Division corridor resulted in a computerized log entry "CORR TO BACTI IN." When he left the Bacteriology Division corridor to re-enter the Staff Area, he would again have to use his key card to open the door. The log entry would be "CORR TO BACTI OU."
Upon entering the Bacteriology Division corridor, Dr. Ivins would proceed past Suites 1 and 2 to reach the suite that contained his personal lab. To enter Suite 3 of the Bacteriology Division (also known as "Suite B3"), Dr. Ivins would again have to use his keycard. Opening the door to enter Suite B3 would log as "B301 IN/M" indicating he was entering room B301 and that it was a Male (M) locker room. To open the door to leave B301 he would again use his keycard and the log entry would be "B301 OUT/M."
The enlarged floorplan of Suite B3 below shows the location of Bruce Ivins' lab in room B313, along with the other labs and rooms in the Biosafety Level 3 suite. Based upon the size of the door openings (which are generally 36 inches), room B313 is approximately 11 feet wide by 17 feet long.
Everything within the Suite, except for the Men's and Women's Locker Rooms, were BioSafety Level-3 areas.
Ivins would (presumably) leave his outer clothing in his personal locker (#10) within Room B301, including his keycard, and he'd then be ready to enter the main lab area.
To enter the BioSafety Level-3 "containment" section of Suite B3, Dr. Ivins would have to enter his Personal Identification Number (PIN) into an electronic keypad that was to the left of the first door of the airlock. Typing in his PIN would open the door and record in the in-out logs as "B301 KEYPAD." (He'd also have to stand on a pressure pad which assured that only one person was entering the airlock.) When leaving the airlock to return back into room B301, there was no need to use a keypad or a keycard. The door evidently opened by simply pulling it open.
Evidently, both "airlock" doors could not be open at the same time. This would prevent airborne bacteria from the outside rushing in to contaminate the suite and also prevented dangerous bacteria inside the suite from rushing out and contaminating room B301 and possibly the Bacteriology corridor and the building.
The Bacteriology Division's Suite B3 was also under negative pressure (air would be sucked into the suite when anyone entered from the outside corridor).
|(The original floorplan
showed a door between the shower room and room B301, but I've been
reliably informed that that door was always locked, could not be opened
and didn't even have door knobs or handles. So, on the floorplan
above I show no doorway there.)
Page 26 in FBI pdf file #847443 describes a tour of Bacteriology Suite 3 (B3) that Dr. Ivins gave to some FBI agents on February 12, 2003:
IVINS took the agents on a walk through of the areas of
Building 1425 where he handled the anthrax letters. He received
the Daschle letter contained in two or three ziploc bags from
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX He took the letter through the B3
passbox into Room 313, IVINS' lab space in B3. 313 can be seen
through the window to the left of the B3 passbox as well as through
the B3 crash door.
The window in the wall next to the passbox was a small observation window, not a large viewing window. And the window in the door to B304 was similarly small. So, one could only see a tiny part of the outside wall of Room B313 from the B2-B3 corridor window on the cold side of the passbox.
The same FBI reports says this in the next paragraph on page 26:
Ivins pointed out the B3 cold room as being on the right
side of the hallway when looking through the crash door, with a
black box on the door. Room 308 is the pass through to suite B4.
The mouse animal room is the third door down on the right when
looking through the crash door. The guinea pig room is across the
hall with the cleaning supplies for the suite located to the right
of the door as the room is entered.
Those two paragraphs indicate that the FBI agents could not enter the BSL-3 "hot" suite, probably because they weren't vaccinated against anthrax. They could only look into the "containment suite" through windows from the "cold" side corridors.
The photograph below appears to have been taken of Ivins working inside his lab in room B313:
Part of the door from the central hallway is visible at the left edge of the picture above. In the picture, Ivins is in scrubs and is wearing safety glasses as he prepares some Petri dishes (a.k.a. "plates") possibly for transporting to incubators in room B304. The plates appear to be on a metal cart or in a metal tray. Note that the plates are stacked and there are three visible stacks on the cart/tray with at least 7 or 8 plates in a stack.
There's an ice-maker in the corner with buckets for hauling ice. To the right of the ice-maker is a biosafety cabinet. When using the biosafety cabinet, the scientist sits on the chair in front of the cabinet and reaches into it via an opening at arm level. The opening is about 12 inches from top to bottom and runs the width of the cabinet. Above the opening is a glass or plexiglass window which allows the scientist to see what he is handling on the tabletop inside the cabinet. Ivins would have probably have inoculated the plates inside the cabinet, then closed the plates before removing them from the cabinet and putting them on the cart or tray.
The biosafety cabinet also has negative air pressure. Fans suck air from the room into the cabinet and filters remove all aerosolized particles from the air before the air is allowed to exit either at the top of the cabinet or through exhaust pipes that vent out through the roof. This prevents any dangerous materials that might aersolize as they are being handled inside the cabinet from floating out through the opening and into the laboratory.
Note that the laboratory door has no knob. The hook seems to be designed to allow the person wanting to leave the lab to open the door with his arm if his hands are full, if his gloves are contaminated or if he doesn't want his bare hands to touch anything. The lock on the door appears to only lock and unlock from the inside.
On Friday, February 19, 2010, the FBI and DOJ released their "Amerithrax Investigative Summary" along with 2,720 pages of supplementary files. Pages 49 to 57 of FBI file #847547 contain Ivins' In-Out logs for all of August and September 2001, along with the log entries for October 1 through 10.
Below are Dr. Ivins' log entries for August 20, 2001:
To understand where he was and how he got there, it must be understood that he could not cross from the Bacteriology corridor to the Animal Resources corridor via the B2-B3 corridor. About a third of the way from Bacteriology to AR, the B2-B3 corridor was blocked by a gate that could not be opened. The B2-B3 corridor was also being used as an office area.
The B4-B5 corridor appears to have been similarly blocked. However, the doorway into the AR corridor from Suite B5 is said to have been "not under any access control," and page 43 of FBI pdf file #847443 says "access to Suite B5 could also be gained via the crash door" and seems to indicate that the lock on the door was a key-type lock and "only worked some of the time." Therefore, it seems most likely that the only way Ivins could get from the Bacteriology corridor to the Animal Resources corridor without using his keycard was by walking in one end of Suite B5 and out the other. Thus:
Here's a diagram of the route Dr. Ivins appears to have taken on the evening of August 20, 2001:
Previously, I had interpreted the log data to say that Ivins entered Suite B3 at 7:58 PM , he looked around to see if anyone else was in the suite, and then he exited via the "crash door," walked up the B2-B3 corridor and re-entered Suite B3 again, this time also going into the shower room for a couple minutes before leaving. Wrong, wrong, wrong. The "crash door" cannot be opened without sounding alarms. It is never used.
It now appears that Ivins wasn't just checking to see if anyone else was in Suite B3, he was apparently checking to see if anyone else was anywhere in the Bacteriology or Animal Resources Divisions. He walked in one end of Suite B5 and out the other and used a door to exit from Suite B5 that he probably shouldn't have been using. And from the Animal Resources corridor he could look into Suite B3 through the window in the "crash door" to see if anyone was inside.
It took Dr. Ivins six minutes from the time he used his keycard to exit from room B301 into the Bacteriology corridor until he used his keycard again to exit from the Animal Resources corridor into the Staff Area. So, while Dr. Ivins had a BSL-2 lab within Suite B5, he clearly couldn't have spent much more than a couple minutes in it as he walked through Suite B5.
He only went into Suite B3 for a couple minutes, probably to get something from a locker.
On page 9 of the Search Warrant in FBI file #07-526-m-01 the FBI provided this month by month graph of the time Dr. Ivins spent in Suite B3 during the evenings in all of 2000 and 2001:
The bar chart below (click on it to view a larger version) shows Dr. Ivins' evening times in the Bacteriology Division and in Suite B3 from August 1, 2001, through October 10, 2001. Red bars represent Ivins' times in Suite B3. The green portions represent additional times spent in the Bacteriology Division but not in Suite B3. This could represent time Dr. Ivins spent in his lab in Room B505 in Suite B5.
The data shows that Ivins had only an occasional need to go into the Bacteriology Division or Suite B3 prior to August 31. Starting on August 31, when he allegedly started preparing the anthrax powders for the media letters, he began working every evening in Suite B3. That continued until 9/11, a day in which Ivins became almost panicky and worried that USAMRIID might be a target for one of the hijacked airliners. He worked fewer hours in his lab on that evening. The next two evenings he didn't go into his lab at all. Presumably, he was changing his plans in some way as a result of the events of 9/11.
On the 14th, 15th and 16th, Dr. Ivins again worked long unexplained evening hours in his lab. He evidently completed his preparation of the media anthrax powders on the 16th. The media letters were mailed on the evening of September 17th. On that evening, Dr. Ivins was in Building 1425 for 13 minutes, from 7:00 to 7:13 PM, but didn't enter the Bacteriology Division. He had a 11 hour, 50 minute "window" to drive to New Jersey to mail the letters before he logged back into Building 1425 at 7:03 AM on the morning of the 18th.
The bar chart shows very clearly that, after mailing the media letters, Ivins suddenly no longer had any reason to go into his lab. He was evidently in "wait mode," waiting for the letters to Tom Brokaw, Dan Rather, Peter Jennings, The New York Post and The National Enquirer to be delivered and for the letters to create the panic and news broadcasts that he assumed would result from their delivery.
But, nothing happened. The only time he went into his lab during the ten days from September 17 through September 27 was on Tuesday, September 25, when he was apparently instructed by Patricia Worsham to clean up his lab. An email Dr. Ivins wrote on the evening of September 26th indicates that he had been in Suite B3 cleaning the ceiling light covers on the previous evening:
On Friday, September 28th, Dr, Ivins appears to have decided he had waited long enough for the media letters to be delivered. Something had clearly gone wrong. So, he then allegedly returned to working in his lab during off-hours as he began working on the senate powders. He worked on the senate powders from September 28 through October 5th. Then he had to drive to New Jersey to mail the letters to Senators Daschle and Leahy, and to wait for this second batch of anthrax letters to be delivered and to have their effect. Again, he suddenly had no further reason to go into his lab in Suite B3 in the evenings.
The chart above shows very clearly when Ivins was allegedly making the first batch of powdered anthrax, when he was waiting for the media letters to be delivered, when he was making the second batch of powdered anthrax, and when he was waiting for the senate letters to be delivered.
The raw data used in this analyis is from FBI file #847547, pages 49 to 57. Some data in the FBI file is unclear. For example, there are times when Ivins left work after midnight, and the logs only show PM times. However, notes on the sides of the logs may indicate a time Ivins "left," but they don't indicate if the time means when he left Suite B3, when he left the Bacteriology Division or when he left Building 1425. There are also a few times which seem to be missing. I added question marks after those times. Fortunately, the missing times don't affect any important numbers.
1,882 minutes equals 31 hours, 22 minutes.
771 minutes equals 12 hours 51 minutes - This is the time on the FBI graph of Ivins' overtime hours in B3.
655 minutes equals 10 hours 55 minutes.
So, during evenings in August 2001, Ivins spent over 31 hours in Building 1425, but only about 13 of those hours were spent in the Bacteriology Division. The rest of the time may have been in his office or in some other area of the building that didn't require key card access. Note that there are multiple times when Dr. Ivins entered the Bacteriology Division corridor for only 1 minute, but didn't go into the BSL-3 part of Suite B3. He presumably was just putting thing in or taking things out of his locker in the Men's locker room. Dr. Ivins also had a lab in room B505 in Suite B5, but it would seemingly take more than a minute to get to it and back to the corridor door with the keycard reader.
Something may have happened on the Friday or on the weekend before Monday, August 13 that caused Ivins to suddenly start spending unusual hours in his BSL-3 lab.
Note that Dr. Ivins only spent 8 out of 31 August evenings in his lab, but 5 of those evenings were on weekends. So, he not only started working unusual hours in his lab, but in August he was doing much of the unusual work on weekends.
4,240 minutes = 70 hours and 40 minutes
2,529 minutes = 43 hours and 9 minutes
1,854 minutes = 30 hours and 54 minutes
* includes time spent in the library: 14 minutes on the 22nd, 13 minutes on the 28th.
The most important fact that jumps out at me when I look at the chart for September is that Ivins was NOT in his lab for a single minute during the evenings from the 17th through the 24th. Then, on the 25th, he spent nearly 2 hours in Suite B3 cleaning ceiling light covers and doing other cleaning. Then he again didn't have any reason to go back in his lab for two more evenings.
October 1-10, 2001
1,041 minutes = 17 hours, 21 minutes
699 minutes = 11 hours, 39 minutes
610 minutes = 10 hours, 10 minutes
Note, that during the weekend of October 6 and 7, when the second batch of letters was presumably mailed, it was the first time Ivins didn't work on a weekend since August 11 and 12. He was allegedly beginning another period of waiting for the anthrax letters to generate panic. He only spent 14 minutes in his lab during the period from Oct. 6 to 10. Other records show that he didn't have any reason to work evenings in his lab on the 11th or 12th, either.
In summary, Ivins was clearly working unusually long hours in his lab in Suite B3 lab during the times he was allegedly making the anthrax powders, and he spent almost no time at all in that same lab after the letters were mailed, while he was allegedly waiting for the letters to be delivered and for reactions to the letters.
The chart below shows that Ivins' overtime hours in his lab had been gradually decreasing for over a year before he suddenly starting working the unusual and unexplained hours in his lab in August of 2001:
The chart below compares five years of Ivins' overtime hours and shows even more clearly how unusual his hours were in August, September and October of 2001 when he was allegedly making the anthrax powders.
Someone argued that the long evening hours may reflect that he wasn't working during the day. But, the facts show Ivins was usually working during the day when he was also working long evening hours.
Using data from USAMRIID's file of Dr. Ivins' hours in Suite B3 during 2001, bar charts were developed to show how his daytime hours compared to his evening hours for August, September and October of 2001. Here are the charts (click on them to view larger versions):
The charts show even more clearly that Dr. Ivins suddenly had little reason to go into Suite B3 after he allegedly mailed the media anthrax letters on September 17 until he started working on the senate letters, presumably on September 28.. And, the pattern appears again after he allegedly mailed the senate letters around October 6. He suddenly again had little reason to go back into Suite B3 in the evening.
The charts also show that on weekends he seldom worked in Suite B3 during the day, but he frequently working in Suite B3 in the evening. Of the 26 Saturdays and Sundays during these three months, he worked in Suite B3 on four days, and he worked in Suite B3 on fourteen evenings, thirteen of them in August and September.
Here are the work sheets for those three months:
Times in red = Ivins only went into locker room B301 and didn't use the keypad to enter BSL-3 area.
? for August 14 = Log shows two keypad entries at 8:51 and 11:21 AM with no exit from B301 between those times. Assuming that Ivins left the BSL-3 area to get something from his locker and then immediately returned to the BSL-3 area.
? for August 21 = Log shows two entries into B301 at 8:24 and 8:28 AM with no exit between. Assuming Ivins opened the door, changed his mind, left, then returned 4 minutes later.
? for August 27 = Log shows two entries into B301 at 1:21 and 1:22 PM with no exit between. Assuming Ivins opened the door, changed his mind, left, then returned 1 minute later.
? for August 28 = Log shows two entries into B301 at 1:14 and 1:16 PM with no exit between. Assuming Ivins opened the door, changed his mind, left, then returned 2 minutes later.
1,406 minutes = 23 hours, 26 minutes
700 minutes = 11 hours, 40 minutes
Times in red = Ivins only went into locker room B301 and didn't use the keypad to enter BSL-3 area.
? for Sept. 9 = log seems to indicate that Ivins spent 39 minutes in room B301 before using the keypad.
? for Sept. 28 = log shows 10:36 AM exit time. Can't be 10:36 PM, because Ivins is enroute to library at that time. So, assume 9:36 PM.
1,324 minutes = 22 hours and 4 minutes
2,131 minutes = 35 hours and 31 minutes
Times in red = Ivins only went into locker room B301 and didn't use the keypad to enter BSL-3 area.
? for October 1 = Ivins logged out of B301 at 8:09 AM but didn't log back in before using the keypad. It's assumed that he logged out, but didn't go out and instead turned around and used the keypad.
? for October 3 = Invalid in-time (8:03 AM), keypad time used as in-time instead.
? for October 13 = In-out log shows only a keypad entry at 9:58 AM, no entries for the Suite B3 door.
? for October 24 = 7:02 and 7:41 AM are both IN. 9:08 and 9:08 are both IN.
? for October 31 = Log shows two keypad entries at 7:54 PM and 8:22 PM with nothing in between. Assume Ivins left the BSL-3 area into the locker room at some point and then returned to the BSL-3 area again.
1,773 minutes = 29 hours, 33 minutes
857 minutes = 14 hours, 17 minutes
Uunlike previous work sheets, the sheets above use Ivins' entry into B301 as the start time, not his use of the keypad. As a result, it can be seen that Dr. Ivins often spent only a minute or less in Room B301. Presumably, he was just putting something in his locker or removing something from his locker.
A PBS Frontline program "The Anthrax Files" which aired on October 11, 2011, suggested that Ivins' overtime hours in his lab weren't really very unusual. PBS Frontline's reporter said:
In fact, Frontline, ProPublica and McClatchy newspapers have taken a close look at Ivins' lab work records. The FBI chart was based upon the night hours in only one lab. But, our research shows it was not unusual for Ivins to work late at the other labs and offices throughout the Army complex. And, during those days the FBI found suspicious, Ivins was in fact performing a number of time-sensitive experiments in the lab.
And they showed this graph:
In reality, the facts show that Ivins did not work in "other labs" on those evenings - except for his BSL-2 lab in Suite B5 where he could have been preparing things for use in Suite B3. And, he was definitely not required to work 14 or 16 hour days. The facts indicate he spent most of the evening times in his office on personal matters, puttering around on his computer and sending emails to former associates - primarily to Mara Linscott.
When the FBI tried to copy the hard drive from his office computer in 2005, they discovered that all of his emails for the year 2001 were missing, although Ivins' emails from prior and subsequent years were still in his computer. Ivins claimed he didn't know what happened to his 2001 emails. (Some of the emails, however, were evidently recovered from the computers belonging to the recipients of the emails.) The destruction of those emails from 2001 is another example of Ivins destroying evidence that might be used against him.
Frontline didn't explain what they meant by Ivins performing "a number of time sensitive experiments" in his lab. But, some of Dr. Ivins' supporters (who have their own theories about who sent the anthrax letters) claim that Dr. Ivins was tending to animals during the times he was spending in Suite B3 in August, September and particularly October, 2001. The FBI's Summary Report says in footnote 21 on page 32:
Dr. Ivins did make notations regarding the health of some mice involved in a study being conducted by another colleague – thus justifying his presence in the lab for a short time on each of those days (Friday, September 28 through Tuesday, October 2). However, the first three of those days, he was in the hot suites for well over an hour, far longer than necessary to check to see if any mice were dead. And for the three nights before each mailing window, Dr. Ivins was in the hot suites for between two and four hours each night, with absolutely no explanation.
These could be the "time-sensitive experiments" mentioned in the PBS Frontline program. Someone was scheduled to check on the animals at 10 PM on September 28 through October 2. And a notebook he shared with a co-worker says someone did check on them. The notebook is #4383 which can be viewed by clicking HERE. Page 3 from that notebook is the "Mouse Passive Experiment" chart shown below:
What the "Mouse Passive Experiment" chart appears to show is that "Day 1" for the animal test was Thursday, September 27, 2001. The test involved four groups of mice, with 10 mice per group. Group 1 had been vaccinated weeks earlier with the AVA anthrax vaccine (AVA = Anthrax Vaccine Absorbed). Groups 2 & 3 were injected with AVA plus an additive. And the 10 mice in Group 4 were injected with "normal rabbit" antiserum.
On Day 1 of the test, all the mice were injected with anthrax spores.
1 mouse in Group 4 died on Day 1 from causes unrelated to anthrax. All the other mice in Group 4 were dead by Day 5. All the mice in groups 2 & 3 were dead by Day 8. When the test ended on Day 13, there were still 5 vaccinated mice alive in Group 1.
So, how much of Dr. Ivins' Suite B3 time was spent doing these animal checks? Answer: NONE.
I compared Ivins' day and evenings times in Suite B3 (as reported by USAMRIID) to the times on the notebook page and found that, of the 22 times the animals were checked, Ivins was in Suite B3 only 2 of those times, and both of those times were during the day.
Here are the 22 times the animals were checked, showing when Ivins was or was not in Suite B3:
1. Thur. 27 Sept. = 1:30 PM - NOT in B3
2. Fri. 28 Sept. = 8:30 AM - NOT in B3
3. 10:00 PM - NOT in B3
4. Sat., 29 Sept. = 11:30 AM - NOT in B3
5. 3:00 PM - NOT in B3
6. 10:00 PM - NOT in B3
7. Sun. 30 Sept. = 11:00 AM - NOT in B3
8. 11:30 AM - NOT in B3
9. 3:00 PM - NOT in B3
10. 10:00 PM - NOT in B3
11. Mon. 1 Oct. = 8:30 AM - In Suite B3
12. 1:30 PM - NOT in B3
13. 10:00 PM - NOT in B3
14. Tue. 2 Oct. = 10:00 PM - NOT in B3
15. Wed. 3 Oct. = 9:00 AM - NOT in B3
16. 1:30 PM - NOT in B3
17. Thur. 4 Oct. = 2:30 PM - In Suite B3
18. Fri. 5 Oct. = 10:00 AM - NOT in B3
19. Sat. 6 Oct. = 9:45 AM - NOT in B3
20. Sun. 7 Oct. = 9:45 AM - NOT in B3
21. Mon. 8 Oct. = 9:45 AM - NOT in B3
22. Tue. 9 Oct. = 3:30 PM - NOT in B3
Logic says that if Bruce Ivins was not in Suite B3 when someone did 20 of the animal checks, then Ivins almost certainly wasn't doing the animal checks. They were being done by an assistant (probably Patricia Fellows). His assistant did the checks and either reported the findings to Ivins so he could record them in their notebook, or, more likely, she recorded the times herself.
On December 3, 2013, I did an analysis of Ivins' in-out logs for Sunday, September 30, 2001. Here is the section of the "Mouse Passive Expt" chart for that day:
From FBI file #847547, page 55, here are Dr. Bruce Edwards Ivins' in-out log data for that entire day:
Clearly, Ivins could not have done any of the morning and afternoon mouse checks, since he never entered Building 1425 until 9:53 PM in the evening.
But, what about the 2200 (10 PM) mouse checks? When I analyzed the in-out log data, what I found was very interesting:
9:53 - Ivins enters Building 1425
9:55 - Ivins enters the Bacteriology Division Corridor
9:55 - Ivins enters the Men's change room B301 to take off coat
9:56 - Ivins leaves the Men's change room B301.
Ivins goes to Suite B5, which has no key card reader.
Ivins uses the back door of B5 to sneak into the AR corridor.
From the AR corridor he looks through the crash door into Suite B3.
He probably sees that Pat Fellows is still in B3 checking on the mice
10:06 - Ivins leaves the Animal Resource Division and probably goes to his office
10:34 - Ivins again enters the Bacteriology Division Corridor.
Ivins again goes to B5. He again sneaks into the AR corridor
Ivins again looks into Suite B3. This time he sees no one is in B3
10:39 - Ivins leaves the AR Division.
10:39 - Ivins again enters the Bacteriology Division Corridor
10:40 - Ivins enters the Men's change room B301
10:44 - Ivins enters the airlock to get into the BSL-3 part of Suite B3 & his lab
Ivins does work related to making anthrax powders
12:02 - Ivins leaves B3 (according to the FBI)
And what about the next evening, October 1, when his assistant also did a mouse check at 10 PM?
Ivins didn't use the keycard to enter the BSL3 part of Suite B3 until 10:19 PM, after his assistant was gone.
And what about the next evening, October 2, when his assistant also did a mouse check at 10 PM?
Ivins entered Suite B3 at 8:06 PM and left at 8:29 PM, before his assistant arrived.
Note that the "Passive Mouse Expt" chart shows that Ivins' assistant no longer did any 10 PM checks after October 2nd. On October 3, 2001, she only checked the mice at 9 AM and 1:30 PM. So, what did Ivins do that evening?
Ivins entered Suite B3 at 7:37 PM and worked until 10:35 PM, almost 3 hours.
On October 4, Ivins worked in Suite B3 from 6:21 PM until 6:55 PM.
On October 5, Ivins worked in Suite B3 from 8:03 PM until 8:53 PM. Then again from 9:07 PM to 11:56 PM.
The important fact illustrated here that the "unexplained" time Dr. Bruce Ivins spent in his lab during this period had absolutely NOTHING to do with checking on animals. Dr. Ivins was making anthrax powders in his lab on those evenings.
I don't have Ivins' evening hours in Building 1425 for any times prior to August, 2001, but the data for August, September and October 1-10, 2001, show that Ivins did indeed go into Building 1425 very often in the evening:
The graph above (click on it to view a larger version) shows in red Ivins' time in Building 1425 that was not spent in the Bacteriology Division or in Suite B3. The time he spent in the Bacteriology Division is shown in green. Combined, they are his total evening time in Building 1425. The graph shows there are numerous times when he went into Building 1425 in the evening and did not go into the Bacteriology Division. But the graph shows once again that the evening time Ivins spent in the Bacteriology Divison during the periods when he was alleged to have been making the attack anthrax powders were very unusual.
Much ado was also made on various blogs by Ivins' supporters about a calendar or schedule shown on page 123 of FBI pdf file #847447. The calendar appears to indicate that Dr. Ivins was scheduled to do "guinea pig & Mouse checks" at 8 PM on September 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, plus "mouse checks" on September 14, 15, 16, 28, 29 and 30. The calendar was found among Ivins' possessions during the November 1, 2007 search. Ivins' supporters claim those animal checks show he was in his lab for valid purposes on those evenings.
In reality, however, animal checks only take a few minutes (in spite of unverified claims that, if animals were found dead, Dr. Ivins would have immediately necropsied them, then autoclaved them and removed the remains to trash receptacles. The facts show that Ivins didn't follow protocols and left biohazard trash in autoclave bags in his lab for weeks). There's no evidence that the calendar was anything more than a plan -- a plan which may never have been implemented. And, a check of Dr. Ivins in-out logs for those evenings shows that he was in different places on different evenings at 8 PM.
September 1 - Not in Building 1425.
September 2 - In Suite B5, apparently.
September 3 - In the B301 locker room.
September 4 - In Suite B5, apparently.
September 5 - Not in Building 1425
September 6 - In Suite B3.
September 7 - In Suite B3.
September 8 - In Suite B3.
September 9 - In Suite B5, apparently.
September 10 - In his office, presumably.
September 11 - In Suite B3.
September 14 - Not in Building 1425.
September 15 - Not in Building 1425.
September 16 - In Suite B3.
September 28 - In Suite B3.
September 29 - Not in Building 1425.
September 30 - Not in Building 1425.
No matter how one looks at the facts, Ivins was spending an unusual amount of time in his lab in August, September and October, and he had no verifiable explanation for the bulk of the time he'd spent in his lab.
The facts say that during those times, Ivins was making the anthrax powders. The facts indicate that his source material for the powders were anthrax bacterial growths on discarded agar plates that had been allowed to accumulate in autoclave bags in his lab for weeks. He may have been accumulating spores from plates and storing them in a beaker in the B311 cold room for as long as a year before he suddenly began working evenings to turn the crude, wet spores into lethal powders.
If Bruce Ivins hadn't committed suicide, and if he had been put on trial for murder and terrorism, the jury would have been shown the in-out logs and the prosecutor would have stepped through the critical evenings to explain to the jury exactly what the information indicated regarding Ivins' activities.
Here are Ivins' in-out log times for the critical evening of October 5, 2001, the evening when Bruce Ivins allegedly finished making the anthrax powders for the senate letters:
The log shows that Ivins used his key card to enter Building 1425 at 7:40 PM. He then used his key card again to enter the Bacteriology corridor at 7:44 PM. Eight minutes later, he used his key card again to exit from the Animal Resources corridor 7:52 PM. So, again Dr. Ivins had gone through Suite B5 and the unlocked door to get into the AR corridor. It's possible that he went into Suite B5 to get something from his BSL-2 lab in room B505, but doing that doesn't explain why he didn't go back to Suite B3 the same way. It appears (just like on September 20 and 30) he was either looking through the window of the crash door to see if anyone was in Suite B3 or he was checking the two divisions to make certain there was no one else around.
After exiting the AR corridor, he may have gone to his office to get something. He then entered the Bacteriology Division corridor again at 7:59 and entered Suite B3 also at 7:59 PM. This time he spent 9 minutes in the B301 locker room changing clothes before using the keypad at 8:03 PM to get into the airlock and into the BSL-3 area of suite B3. He evidently worked in his lab in room B313 for 54 minutes, from 8:03 PM to 8:57 PM. At 8:57 PM he used his keycard to open the door to the Bacteriology corridor and stepped out into the corridor for 2 minutes before returning to the Locker room in B301 again at 8:59 PM. Less than a minute later, he went back into the corridor again. And less than a minute after that, he returned to B301 again at 9 PM. Again in less than a minute, he left B301 and entered the corridor. This time, however, he walked to the end of the corridor and used his keycard to enter the Staff Area at 9:01.
He probably went to his office for something. At 9:05 PM, Ivins again used his keycard to enter the Bacteriology corridor. And in less than a minute he again entered room B301 in Suite B3. Two minutes later, he entered the BSL-3 part of the suite via the keypad and the airlock.
Dr. Ivins appears to have spent another hour and 48 minutes in his lab that evening. He left Suite B3 to enter the Bacteriology corridor at 11:55 PM. He took another surveillance walk through Suite B5 and exited the Animal Resources corridor into the Staff Area at 11:58 PM.
It's unknown when he actually left Building 1425 that evening, since the logs don't show information from after midnight. But he presumably left the building shortly after leaving the AR corridor at 11:58 PM.
It may have been the next evening that Ivins drove once again to Princeton, New Jersey, and mailed the second batch of anthrax letters. It was the Columbus Day weekend, and the in-out logs show that Bruce Ivins didn't go into Building 1425 at all on Saturday and Sunday, October 6th and 7th. It was the first full weekend he'd taken off in nearly two months. He'd been a busy man during those two months.